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THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND A
COMMON LAW BILL OF RIGHTS—
CLEAR STATEMENT RULES HEAD
DOWN UNDER
Dan Meagher*
In our steadfast faith in responsible government and in plenary
legislative powers distributed, but not controlled, you as Americans may perceive nothing better than a willful refusal to see
the light and an obstinate adherence to heresies; but we remain
impenitent. Yet, in most other respects our constitution makers followed with remarkable fidelity the model of the American instrument of government. Indeed it may be said that,
roughly speaking, the Australian Constitution is a redraft of
the American Constitution of 1787 with modifications found
suitable for the more characteristic British institutions and for
Australian conditions.1
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INTRODUCTION

I

n fundamental and enduring respects, the Australian Constitution mirrors its U.S. counterpart.2 It is a written and
entrenched constitution that establishes a system of federalism,
a supreme federal court, and a national government of separated
powers.3 That was no accident. Andrew Inglis Clark, the framer
responsible for the original draft of the Australian document,
was a man for whom the U.S. Constitution was held in almost
mystical regard.4 That draft also contained a series of formal
rights guarantees that were inspired by the U.S. Bill of Rights
and were seen by Clark to be the necessary consequence of a re-

2. Professor Frickey notes that “[i]n large part because of shared common
law roots, Australia and the United States have a similar legal culture.” Philip
P. Frickey, Structuring Purposive Statutory Interpretation: An American Perspective, 80 AUSTL. L.J. 849, 849 (2006); see also James A. Thomson, American
and Australian Constitutions: Continuing Adventures in Comparative Constitutional Law, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 627, 649–71 (1997).
3. See GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN TRONE, LUMB & MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 10–30 (7th ed. 2007); MICHAEL COPER,
ENCOUNTERS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 72–86 (1987).
4. See ANDREW INGLIS CLARK, STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1997); John Reynolds, A.I. Clark’s American Sympathies and his Influence on
Australian Federation, 32 AUSTL. L.J. 62 (1958).
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publican form of government with natural rights at its constitutional and moral core.5 Those formal rights, however, were deleted from the final text of the Australian Constitution, which
was enacted into law by the Imperial Parliament in 1900, and
came into operation on January 1, 1901.6 The other framers,
steeped in the orthodoxy of British constitutional theory and
practice, rejected the U.S. notion of constitutional rights and advocated that a combination of the common law and parliamentary government (with the principle of responsible government
at its heart) offered a superior and more democratic model of
rights protection.7 This was one of the foundational decisions of
Australian constitutional design, and it has exerted a powerful
attitudinal (and institutional) influence on how rights are legally
protected in Australia. Specifically, the profound Australian reluctance about formal rights guarantees—which persists to this
day—originated in that decision to excise the formal rights guarantees from Clark’s original draft.
As this article will demonstrate, however, the absence of a constitutional bill of rights notwithstanding, the U.S influence on
the legal protection of fundamental human rights in Australia
would ultimately not be denied. A remarkable—and controversial—judicial response was sparked by a combination of legal developments. These were successive failed attempts to amend the
Australian Constitution and enact a statutory bill of rights to
provide more formal rights protection as well as the emergence
of new species of (constitutionally valid) legislation, which were
openly hostile to fundamental human rights. The Australian
High Court (“the Court”) transformed an old interpretive canon
(with U.S. roots) into a strong Australian species of clear statement rules for fundamental human rights called “the principle
of legality.”8 The methodology of clear statement rules—which

5. Andrew Inglis Clark, Natural Rights, 16 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI., no. 2, 1900, at 36.
6. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) (“Australian Constitution Act”) was passed on July 9, 1900, as an ordinary act of the
Westminster Parliament. Indeed, what is now the Australian Constitution is
contained in Section 9 of that act. By royal proclamation, the Australian Constitution Act took effect on January 1, 1901, and on this date, the new Commonwealth of Australia came into existence. See CHERYL SAUNDERS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 9–19 (2011).
7. Dixon, supra note 1, at 102.
8. See infra Part IV.

68

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:1

require unmistakably clear statutory language (“magic language”)9 to curtail or abrogate fundamental human rights—underpins this refashioned canon. The Court continues to do so to
fill the lacuna in formal rights protection in Australia and to
temper (if not outright resist) increasingly common legislative
attempts to eradicate fundamental human rights—such as liberty, due process, and access to the courts—especially in the areas of criminal investigation and migration policy.
The robust application of the principle of legality began in the
1980s in a series of Australian High Court cases, which served
to protect a range of fundamental human rights that, taken together, are now said to constitute a common law Australian Bill
of Rights.10 This doctrine has proven to be strongly resistant to
legislative encroachment, maybe defiantly so, and also made
clear the normative justification for the judicial application of
the principle in contemporary Australian law. The original justification for the old canon (like interpretive canons more generally) was the discovery and vindication of authentic legislative
intention. But, it is difficult to square the manner in which the
Australian High Court has applied the principle of legality—to
protect fundamental human rights in the heart of legislation
that intends to curtail or abrogate them—with that justification.
As a consequence, the Court, arguably and controversially,
turned to the Australian Constitution to provide its contemporary justification and guide its future development.11 This is one
part of the Australian High Court’s move toward providing the
rules and principles of statutory interpretation with a constitutional foundation. It led to the fundamental reconceptualization
of the interpretive duty of judges as one that determines legislative intention as the product—not goal—of statutory interpretation. In terms of the principle of legality, the Court effectively
dispensed with its original normative justification and used the

9. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 354–55 (2d ed. 2006).
10. JAMES J. SPIGELMAN, The Common Law Bill of Rights, in STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1–50 (2008); see Dan Meagher, The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 449
(2011).
11. See Justice John Basten, Constitutional Dimensions of Statutory Interpretation, Speech Delivered at the University of Melbourne School of Law:
Constitutional Law Conference (July 24, 2015).
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method of clear statement to construct a common law Australian
Bill of Rights that is now quasiconstitutional in strength.
In order to detail and critique these remarkable, controversial,
and often U.S.-inspired developments in the judicial protection
of fundamental human rights in Australia, the article will proceed as follows. Part I will outline the profound and enduring
impact U.S. political institutions, constitutional doctrine, and
republican theory had on Andrew Inglis Clark and the structure
and content of his original 1891 draft of the Australian Constitution. That draft established a federal system of government, a
constitutional separation of powers, and—most relevant for the
purposes of this article—a suite of formal rights guarantees that
were inspired by the U.S. Bill of Rights. Clark’s vision of constitutional rights for the new Commonwealth of Australia, however, did not survive the later Constitutional Conventions held
in 1897 and 1898, where drafting took place. The framers consciously decided to remove those rights provisions. Instead, they
opted for the British-inspired model that was deeply skeptical of
formal rights guarantees, preferring to place faith in the common law and democratic politics to protect fundamental human
rights. Part II will explain why the framers made that decision
and will detail the subsequent constitutional and legislative attempts, all unsuccessful, to provide for more formal legal protection of rights. This provides the foundation for the analysis undertaken in Parts III and IV, which will trace the rise of the new
judicial rights consciousness in Australia and how this manifested itself in the fashioning of the principle of legality used to
construct a quasiconstitutional common law Australian Bill of
Rights. Finally, Part V will consider and critique the Australian
High Court’s turn toward the inherently contested and questionbegging principles of the Australian Constitution to anchor the
principle of legality and the interpretive process more generally.
The untethering of notions of authentic legislative intention
from statutory interpretation is a foundational shift in judicial
doctrine and practice. Unsurprisingly, from a normative, doctrinal, and constitutional perspective, it poses as many questions
and problems as it does answers.
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I. ANDREW INGLIS CLARK AND THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
Written in 1891, the original draft of the Australian Constitution was largely the work of one man: Andrew Inglis Clark.12
Clark was from the island state of Tasmania.13 He was a poet,
philosopher, engineer, judge, politician, university vice-chancellor, and fierce republican—at a time when that political persuasion in Australia was necessarily radical in light of the hegemony of British colonial interests.14 In section A, Clark’s fascination with U.S republicanism, and its significant impact on his
political and constitutional ideas, will be explored. Then Clark’s
influential draft of the Australian Constitution and, in particular, his republican vision of constitutional rights will be outlined
in section B.
A. Andrew Inglis Clark and U.S. Republicanism
Significantly in terms of Australian constitutional design,
Clark was the only framer with a detailed knowledge of—indeed
fascination with—U.S. political institutions, constitutional doctrine, and republican theory.15 The primary architect of the Australian Constitution was a member of the American Club16 no
less!

12. See JOHN A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
24 (1972); JOHN WILLIAMS, THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 63–65 (2005).
13. See FRANCIS J. NEASEY & LAWRENCE J. NEASEY, ANDREW INGLIS CLARK
(2001).
14. See A LIVING FORCE: ANDREW INGLIS CLARK AND THE IDEAL OF THE
COMMONWEALTH (Richard Ely ed., 2001); William G. Buss, Andrew Inglis
Clark’s Draft Constitution, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, and the
Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States, 33 MELB. U. L.
REV. 718, 719–23 (2009).
15. See LA NAUZE, supra note 12, at 273; John Williams, Andrew Inglis
Clark: Our Constitution and His Influence, in PAPERS ON PARLIAMENT NO. 61,
‘THE TRUEST PATRIOTISM’: ANDREW INGLIS CLARK AND THE BUILDING OF AN
AUSTRALIAN NATION 86 (2014).
16. The American Club comprised a small group of Tasmanian republicans
that met annually on the 4th of July at Beaurepaire’s Hotel in Hobart, Tasmania to celebrate the founding of the U.S. Constitution. Reynolds, supra note 4,
at 62–63.
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At the American Club annual dinner, which celebrated the
centenary of the Declaration of Independence in Hobart, Tasmania in 1876, Clark told the crowd of “young, ardent republicans”17:
We have met here tonight in the name of the principles which
were proclaimed by the founders of the Anglo-American Republic as those which justified resistance to a government which
had violated them and a permanent repudiation of its authority; and we do so because we believe those principles to be permanently applicable to the politics of the world and the practical application of them in the creation and modification of the
institutions which constitute the organs of our social life to be
our only safeguard against political retrogression.18

In the local newspaper of record, the Hobart Mercury (which is
owned by Rupert Murdoch, another Australian with strong ties
to the United States), Clark was condemned for “holding such
very extreme ultra-republican, if not revolutionary views, and
was one who would find his proper place in a band of Communists.”19 Yet, his ties with the United States were deep, abiding, and of the foremost importance to contemporary (not just
foundational) Australian constitutional law. Of particular significance was Clark’s long-standing correspondence and friendship
with Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. That correspondence is now
housed in the Harvard Law School library.20 It reveals the great
intellectual debt that Clark owed to Holmes and his strong view
that U.S. theory and structure of government ought to provide
the constitutional template to unite the disparate, conflicting,
and geographically isolated colonies in the new Commonwealth
of Australia.21 Clark visited the United States and met with
Holmes in Boston in 1890, 1897, and 1902.22 Interestingly, as
Professor John Williams relates, Clark’s fondness of Holmes was
17. Henry Reynolds, Clark, Andrew Inglis (1848-1907), in 3 AUSTRALIAN
DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY (1969), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/clark-andrew-inglis-3211/text4835.
18. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 62–63 (excerpting Clark’s speech at the
American Club Annual Dinner in Hobart on July 4, 1876).
19. Reynolds, supra note 17.
20. John M. Williams, “With Eyes Open”: Andrew Inglis Clark and our Republican Tradition, 23 FED. L. REV. 149, 162 (1995).
21. J. M. Neasey, Andrew Inglis Clark Senior and Australian Federation,
15 AUSTL. J. POL. & HIST., no. 2, 1969, at 1, 4–6.
22. See Reynolds, supra note 4, at 63–64.
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so apparent that he had “the study window from Holmes’s house
in Boston shipped and installed into the study of his own house,
‘Rosebank’, in Hobart.”23
Unlike his famous U.S. friend and intellectual hero,24 however,
Clark was a firm believer in the centrality and importance of
natural rights.25 Indeed, in 1900, the Annals of the U.S. Academy of Political and Social Science (which Clark joined in 1891)
published a paper of his titled Natural Rights.26 The article explained why the Declaration of Independence was so foundational to Clark’s political philosophy and provided the normative
justification for his unqualified support of a U.S.-style bill of
rights in the new Commonwealth of Australia. Clark stated:
I am a believer in the reality of the fundamental rights of man
. . . and I accept the affirmation of the declaration of independence by the people of the United States of America that for
strictly political purposes all men must be regarded as equal in
the possession of the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.27

It was this republican vision of fundamental rights that informed those provisions in Clark’s draft of the Australian Constitution that sought to provide formal rights guarantees.
B. Andrew Inglis Clark’s Draft Constitution
The new Commonwealth of Australia was created on January
1, 1901, when the Australian Constitution came into operation.28
United States government theory and structure had a profound
influence on Clark’s original draft of the Australian Constitution. Nonetheless, Australia continued to use the Westminster
23. Williams, supra note 20.
24. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 310 (2007). But, for a detailed critique of Holmes’ account of natural
law, see Robert P. George, Holmes on Natural Law, in NATURE IN AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY 127 (Jean De Groot ed., 2004).
25. Andrew Inglis Clark, Why I am a Democrat, reprinted in A LIVING
FORCE: ANDREW INGLIS CLARK AND THE IDEAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH 27 (Richard Ely ed., 2001).
26. Clark, supra note 5.
27. John M. Williams, Race, Citizenship and the Formation of the Australian Constitution: Andrew Inglis Clark and the “14th Amendment,” 42 AUSTL.
J. POL. & HIST. 10, 11 (1996); Clark, supra note 25.
28. See PATRICK PARKINSON, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
132–39 (2d ed. 2001).
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parliamentary system of government that was established by
the English during its colonial reign of the Australian colonies
in the first half of the nineteenth century.29 The Westminster
system entails the principle of responsible government and the
formation of government from the ranks of the elected legislature, specifically by the political party with a majority in the
House of Representatives.30 But, in all other significant respects,
the United States influenced the original draft of the Australian
Constitution in its structure, content, and outlook.31 In this regard, its most obvious defining characteristic was that it was
written and would, when enacted, be entrenched higher law.
That was the most fundamental shift from the prevailing orthodoxy of British constitutional theory and practice in 1891, which
eschewed the need or wisdom of a written and fixed constitution.32 It also established a federal system of government and a
constitutional separation of powers that insulated the judiciary
from the political arms of government.33 In order to do so, Clark
directly copied the structure of the U.S. Constitution by devoting
the first three chapters of his draft constitution to the establishment of the legislative, executive, and judicial arms of the Australian federal government.34 And whilst the relationship between the Australian legislative and executive branches was
29. Indeed, Clark was not a fan of responsible government, which he argued
did not serve the Australian colonies well. See Andrew Inglis Clark, Our Australian Constitutions, 1 QUADRILATERAL 56 (1874); Neasey, supra note 21, at
9–11; Williams, supra note 20, at 170–71.
30. See Geoffrey Lindell, Responsible Government, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND
GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 76–79 (Paul Finn ed., 1995).
31. See Sir Owen Dixon, The Law and the Constitution, 51 L. Q. REV. 590,
597 (1935); Dixon, supra note 1, at 102; Thomson, supra note 2, at 638–49.
32. John Williams, The Emergence of the Commonwealth Constitution, in
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 1, 13–17 (H. P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 2003).
33. See Buss, supra note 14, at 768–99; Thomson, supra note 2, at 666–71.
34. In Australia, the relevant constitutional structure is as follows: Chapter
I: The Parliament (Section 1: “The legislative power of the Commonwealth
shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a
Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called The
Parliament, or The Parliament of the Commonwealth.”), Australian Constitution s 1; Chapter II: The Executive Government (Section 61: “The executive
power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the
Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the execution
and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.”),
Id. s 61; Chapter III: The Judicature (Section 71: “The judicial power of the
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necessarily qualified in a constitutional document that incorporated the Westminster principle of responsible government, the
structural and textual parallels between the draft (and eventual) Chapter III of the Australian Constitution and Article III
of the U.S. Constitution, which both outline the rules and powers
of the respective judiciaries, were striking.35 Indeed, in 1903, the
Harvard Law Review published an article that he wrote titled
The Supremacy of the Judiciary Under the Constitution of the
United States, and Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Australia.36 Importantly, Clark noted in the article that a
written constitution that established a federal system of government required the supremacy of the judiciary in particular.37
Clark, however, did make three important deviations from the
U.S. model. First, the Australian Supreme Court (to be called
the High Court of Australia) would have general appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the decisions of any

Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the
High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament
creates, and in such other courts as to invests with federal jurisdiction. The
High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not
less than two, as the Parliament prescribes.”). Id. s 71.
35. Buss, supra note 14, at 768–69. Professor Buss notes the close similarity
between the structure and content of the judiciary provisions in the Australian
and U.S. Constitutions. This was expressly acknowledged by Clark in the accompanying memorandum to his draft Constitution: “The matters I have
placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal Judicatory are the same as
those placed by the Constitution of the United States under the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the American Union.” John M. Williams, Inglis Clark’s
Memorandum to Delegates, in THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 69 (2005).
36. Andrew Inglis Clark, The Supremacy of the Judiciary Under the Constitution of the United States, and Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Australia, 17 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1903).
37. Williams, supra note 20, at 64.

2016]

Clear Statement Rules Head Down Under

75

federal, state, or territory court.38 Second, the Australian “autochthonous expedient”39 would permit the Commonwealth Parliament to invest state courts with federal jurisdiction40—which
38. Australian Constitution s 73 (“The High Court shall have jurisdiction,
with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and
sentences: (i) of any Justice or Justices exercising the original jurisdiction of
the High Court; (ii) of any other federal court, or court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any other court of any State
from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the
Queen in Council; (iii) of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of
law only; and the judgment of the High Court in all such cases shall be final
and conclusive.”).
39. See R v Kirby: Ex parte Boilermaker’s Society of Australia [1956] 94 CLR
254, 267–68 (Austl.) (“The conception of independent governments existing in
the one area and exercising powers in different fields of action carefully defined
by law could not be carried into practical effect unless the ultimate responsibility of deciding upon the limits of the respective powers of the governments
were placed in the federal judicature. The demarcation of the powers of the
judicature, the constitution of the courts of which it consists and the maintenance of its distinct functions become therefore a consideration of equal importance to the States and the Commonwealth. While the constitutional sphere
of the judicature of the States must be secured from encroachment, it cannot
be left to the judicial power of the States to determine either the ambit of federal power or the extent of the residuary power of the States. The powers of
the federal judicature must therefore be at once paramount and limited. The
organs to which federal judicial power may be entrusted must be prescribed
and the content of their jurisdiction ascertained. These very general considerations explain the provisions of Chap. III of the Constitution which is entitled
‘The Judicature’ and consists of ten sections. It begins with s 71 which says
that the judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court to be called the High Court of Australia and in such other courts
as the Parliament creates or it invest with federal jurisdiction. There is not in
s 51, as there is in the enumeration of legislative powers in Art. I, s.8, of the
American Constitution, an express power to constitute tribunals inferiors to
the Federal Supreme Court. No doubt it was thought unnecessary by the framers of the Australian Constitution who adopted so definitely the general pattern of Art. III but in their variations and departures from its detailed provisions evidenced a discriminating appreciation of American experience. On the
other hand, the autochthonous expedient of conferring federal jurisdiction of
State Courts required a specific legislative power and that is conferred by s
77(iii).”).
40. Australian Constitution s 77(iii) provides state courts with federal jurisdiction. See LESLIE ZINES, COWEN AND ZINE’S FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN
AUSTRALIA 194–95 (3d ed. 2002) (“The use of State courts as repositories of
federal jurisdiction was described by the High Court as an ‘autochthonous expedient’, as indigenous or native to the soil. It has no counterpart in the American Constitution. In the United States, Congress has on many occasions
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reflects the current structure.41 This resulted in the fundamental principle that the Australian Constitution provides for one
unified system of common law.42 Third, and of considerable importance to this article, the Australian High Court would expressly have the power to issue writs of mandamus against an
officer of the Commonwealth,43 which, based on Clark’s
knowledge and (possibly confused)44 understanding of the U.S.

vested concurrently the enforcement of federal rights in State and federal
courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the obligation of
State courts to enforce those rights where they are courts of general jurisdiction or their jurisdiction is otherwise adequate under State law. That does not
mean, however, that the State courts exercise federal jurisdiction in the sense
that that expression is used in s 77(iii) of the Commonwealth Constitution nor
does it enable Congress to legislate in the manner that the Commonwealth
Parliament has done in, for example, s 39 of Judiciary Act.” (citations omitted)).
41. Judiciary Act 1901 (Cth) s 39(2) (Austl.).
42. Lange v Austl Broad Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (Austl.); Kable v DPP
(1996) 189 CLR 51, 112 (Austl.). It is important to note here that the High
Court of Australia—unlike the U.S. Supreme Court—is a general common law
court with inherent common law powers. Sir Owen Dixon outlined its significance in The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation, which
noted that, in Australia, the common law was an antecedent system of law that
formed the backdrop to the creation of the Australian Constitution and provides the context for its ongoing interpretation by the court. Dixon, supra note
1, at 205. In this regard, Professor Pojanowski notes that the general common
law powers of U.S. state courts are more like the Australian High Court than
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law
Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479, 534 (2013). Moreover, the article makes the argument that, as courts with general common law powers, state courts (compared
with their federal counterparts) may be justified in applying a hybrid interpretive model that combines elements of federal-style textualism and a more dynamic purposivism: “This proposal suggests that while constitutional concerns
may preclude state courts from narrowing the semantic meaning of a statute
to fit its background purpose, these courts retain discretion to extend a statute
beyond its linguistic scope in pursuit of the statute’s purpose or broader coherence in the legal fabric.” Id. at 522.
43. Australian Constitution s 75(v); see JAMES STELLIOS, THE FEDERAL
JUDICATURE: CHAPTER III OF THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARY AND CASES 323–
44 (2010).
44. See James Bradley Thayer, Review of Books and Periodicals, 15 HARV.
L. REV. 419, 420 (1902) (observing that the part of Clark’s treatise that discussed Marbury v. Madison was incorrect because it stated that President
Thomas Jefferson once refused to obey a writ of mandamus issued by the U.S.
Supreme Court to compel a judicial appointment made by the President’s successor).
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Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison,45
sufficiently addressed the U.S. Supreme Court’s perceived deficiency in this regard.
The issue of whether the Australian Constitution ought to incorporate a bill of rights, however, was vexing (at least to most
of the framers steeped in the orthodoxy of British constitutional
theory and practice).46 Unsurprisingly, Clark was emphatic in
his support. In this regard, he considered the U.S. model a necessary and desirable consequence of republicanism and emphasized the importance of having a final appellate court, which
would enable any person to petition to it and would ensure that
their constitutional rights and privileges were upheld:
[I]n response to the appeal of the humblest citizen [the U.S.
Supreme Court] will restrain and annul whatever folly or the
ignorance or the anger of a majority of Congress or of the people
may at any time attempt to do in contravention of any personal
or political rights or privilege the Constitution has guaranteed
to him. So great and momentous a power has probably never
been vested in any other judicial tribunal in the world, and the
protective function and impregnable position assigned to the
Supreme Court of the United States may always with pardonable pride be claimed by the advocates of a republican form of
government as having been first exhibited to the world in association with republican institutions. Many of its most important and beneficent decisions have been founded upon those
amendments of the Constitution which as I have previously
stated are frequently described as the American Bill of Rights
and those decisions may be cited as examples of a successful

45. But see LA NAUZE, supra note 12, at 233 (“The origin of [Section 75(v)]
lay in Inglis Clark’s familiarity with American constitutional history. In particular, as he knew, as judgment of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) had held that the Supreme Court had no authority to
issue writs of mandamus to public officers in the exercise of its original (as
distinct from its appellate) jurisdiction, since such writs were not included
among the matters specifically assigned to that jurisdiction by the Constitution. Clark wished to avoid this consequence in the Australian context, and so
deliberately assigned such an authority to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in his draft Bill of 1891.”). See Buss, supra note 14, at 779–88.
46. See GEORGE WILLIAMS & DAVID HUME, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 57–60, 67–69 (2d ed. 2013).
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application to practical politics of the essentially republican
doctrine of the natural rights of man.47

As a result, Clark’s original draft of the Australian Constitution contained the following rights provisions:
Clause 17: A State shall not make or enforce any law abridging
any privilege or immunity of citizens of other States of the
Commonwealth, nor shall a State deny to any person, within
its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.
Clause 46: The Federal Parliament shall not make any law for
the establishment or support of any religion, or for the purpose
of giving any preferential recognition to any religion, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.
Clause 65: The trial of all crimes cognizable by any Court established under the authority of this Act shall be by jury, and
every such trail shall be held in the Province where the crime
has been committed and when not committed within any Province the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Federal
Parliament may by law direct.
Clause 81: No Province shall make any law prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion. 48

As Professors Williams and Hume note: “Clark’s choice of rights
in his draft constitution was idiosyncratic. For example, he included a clause respecting freedom of religion, but nothing that
47. Williams, supra note 20, at 164–65; Andrew Inglis Clark, The Constitution of the United States of America (1897) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the University of Tasmania Library, C4/F1).
48. At the 1897 and 1898 Conventions, Clark sought (unsuccessfully) to delete Clause 17 and replace it with a new version of Clause 110, which read:
The citizens of each state, and all other persons owing allegiance to the Queen and residing in any territory of the Commonwealth, shall be citizens of the Commonwealth, and shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
Commonwealth in the several states; and a state shall not
make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity
of citizens of the Commonwealth, nor shall a state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws.
See WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 65–71; Williams, supra note 27, at
11–16.
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would protect freedom of speech or association.”49 Nevertheless
the constitutional vision for Australia that was embodied in his
draft constitution was considered, criticized, and debated by the
drafters during the Constitutional Conventions held in Sydney
(1891), Adelaide and Sydney (1897), and finally in Melbourne
(1898).50 Remarkably, that vision remained largely intact, notwithstanding Clark’s absence at all but the first of the Constitutional Conventions.51 Of particular significance was his success
in the establishment of an independent and entrenched federal
judiciary, as the drafting committee removed the provisions in
the original draft that entrenched the Australian High Court at
the 1891 Convention, which Clark did not attend.52 He fought
successfully for the restoration of these provisions in 1897, and
they formed part of the final version of the constitution ratified
by the 1897 Constitutional Convention and enacted into law by
the Imperial Parliament in 1900.53
But, Clark’s republican vision of constitutional rights did not
survive the subsequent Constitutional Conventions. The framers consciously decided to renounce those provisions based on
the U.S. Bill of Rights and instead settled upon a final version of
the Australian Constitution that, in terms of rights, owed more
to Albert Venn Dicey and his deep skepticism of formal rights
guarantees.54 That foundational decision on constitutional design exerted an important and constraining influence on the
49. WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 62.
50. See JOHN QUICK & ROBERT GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF
THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 115–206 (reprinted in 1995).
51. George Williams and David Hume note that only eight of the ninety-six
clauses in Clark’s draft Constitution were not adopted in some form in the final
document. WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 54.
52. On Easter weekend of 1891, the Drafting Committee undertook a voyage
on the Lucinda, which departed from Port Jackson in Sydney. On the voyage,
the Drafting Committee removed the provisions in Clark’s 1891 draft that established an independent federal judiciary. Clark did not attend the voyage
due to illness but lobbied successfully to have those provisions restored at the
1897 Convention. See Williams, supra note 20, at 172–73.
53. See Neasey, supra note 21, at 7, 12–15.
54. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 206–07 (10th ed. 1965) (“The security which an Englishman enjoys for personal freedom does not really depend upon or originate in any written document . . . since with us freedom of person is not a special privilege but
the outcome of the ordinary law of the land enforced by the courts. Here, in
short, we may observe the application to a particular case of the general principle that with us individual rights are the basis, not the result, of the law of
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manner in which Australian law provides for the protection of
rights, which Professor Hilary Charlesworth aptly calls “the
Australian reluctance about rights.”55
II. THE AUSTRALIAN RELUCTANCE ABOUT RIGHTS56
This Part will explain briefly why the framers made the decision not to include a bill of rights and will detail the subsequent
constitutional and legislative attempts—all unsuccessful—to
provide for more formal legal protection of fundamental human
rights in Australia. This will set the scene for the analysis undertaken in Parts III–V, which detail how and why Australian
judges filled this lacuna in formal rights protection by fashioning
a strong Australian species of clear statement rules from an old
common law canon to erect (and robustly protect from legislative
encroachment) a common law bill of rights.
A. The Rejection of U.S.-Style Constitutional Rights
At the 1897 and 1898 Constitutional Conventions, the framers
deleted or gutted most of the rights provisions that formed part
of Clark’s draft constitution.57 They expressly rejected the constitutional provisions based on the U.S. Bill of Rights and
strongly affirmed, at least formally, the quintessentially British
faith in the rights-protective capacity of the common law, representative democracy, and responsible government.58 In his
speech, Two Constitutions Compared, which was delivered at
the annual dinner of the American Bar Association in Detroit in
1942, Sir Owen Dixon, generally regarded as Australia’s preeminent jurist,59 explained the Australian reluctance about formal
rights guarantees in the following terms:
the constitution.”); see Eric Barendt, Dicey and Civil Liberties, 1985 PUB. L.
596 (1985); WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 67–69.
55. Hilary Charlesworth, The Australian Reluctance About Rights, 31
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 195 (1993).
56. I acknowledge that this is the title of Professor Charlesworth’s article.
Id.
57. See WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 62–71; Williams, supra note 27,
at 11–18.
58. See DICEY, supra note 54, at 195–202.
59. On April 28, 1986, in a speech to commemorate the 100th Anniversary
of the birth of Sir Owen Dixon, the Governor-General of Australia (and former
justice of the Australian High Court), Sir Ninian Stephen, noted that Lord Diplock of the House of Lords said that Dixon was the outstanding exponent of the
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The men who drew up the Australian Constitution had the
American document before them; they studied it with care. . . .
They all lived, however, under a system of responsible government. That is to say, they knew and believed in the British system by which the Ministers are responsible to the Parliament
and must go out of office whenever they lose the confidence of
the legislature. They felt therefore impelled to make one great
change in adapting the American Constitution. Deeply as they
respected your [U.S.] institutions, they found themselves unable to accept the principle by which the executive government
is made independent of the legislature. . . . In this country men
have come to regard formal guarantees of life, liberty and property against invasion by government, as indispensable to a free
constitution. Bred in this doctrine you may think it strange
that in Australia, a democracy if ever there was one, the cherished American practice of placing in the fundamental law
guarantees of personal liberty should prove unacceptable to
our constitution makers. But so it was. The framers of the Australian Constitution were not prepared to place fetters upon
legislative action. . . . The history of their country had not
taught them the need of provisions directed to the control of
the legislature itself. . . . With the probably unnecessary exception of the guarantee of religious freedom, our constitution
makers refused to adopt any part of the Bill of Rights of 1791
and a fortiori they refused to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment. It may surprise you to learn that in Australia one view
held was that these checks on legislative action were undemocratic, because to adopt them argued a want of confidence in
the will of the people.60

Sir Owen Dixon identified that the framers considered that
rights protection under the Australian Constitution would primarily occur through the processes of representative and responsible government—not judicial review by the courts. That formal
historical account of the framers’ position was shared by Harrison Moore, one of leading constitutional commentators of the
day, who said that the “great underlying principle” of the Australian Constitution is that “the rights of individuals are sufficiently secured by ensuring, as far as possible, to each a share,

common law of his time and that, upon his retirement, was described by a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court as “the greatest judge in the English-speaking
world.” See Dixon, supra note 1, app.
60. Id. at 101–02.
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and an equal share in political power.”61 Constitutional historian, Professor La Nauze, later endorsed this concept in his seminal treatise, The Making of the Australian Constitution,62 and
was subsequently confirmed in the contemporary judgments of
the Australian High Court.63
These matters of (British) constitutional principle and political
theory, however, were not the only reasons why the framers renounced formal rights guarantees of the kind found in the U.S.
Bill of Rights. Clark, for example, clearly modeled Clause 17 in
its original form (amended Clause 110) after the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. But, considerations of
“race and discrimination,”64 and not just a deep faith in the
rights-protective capacity of the common law, representative democracy, and responsible government, motivated the rejection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which enshrined both due process
of law and equal protection under the law. The framers were well
aware that existing colonial legislation, which discriminated on
the basis of race, would likely be imperiled by the implementation of an Australian version of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Around the time of the 1898 Convention, the Goldfields Act in
the state of Western Australia stated that “no Asiatic or African
alien [could] get a miner’s right or go mining on a goldfield.”65
Relevantly, the premier of Western Australia told delegates at
the 1898 Constitutional Convention:
It is of no use for us to shut our eyes to the fact that there is a
great feeling all over Australia against the introduction of coloured persons. It goes without saying that we do not like to talk
61. W. H. MOORE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
329 (1902). But see WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 74 (“For its time, the
Australian Constitution was one of the most democratic in the world. However,
as seen through modern eyes, Moore was blind to the position of many Australians, particularly ethnic minorities, Aboriginal Australians and women.
For some of these people, the ‘great underlying principle’ of the Australian
Constitution was not equality, but the framers’ desire to enable each State to
‘preserve the cultural and racial homogeneity of their societies’ and to ensure
their exclusion from the political process.” (citations omitted)).
62. LA NAUZE, supra note 12, at 231.
63. See McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34 (Austl.); Austl Capital
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 136, 182, 228–29
(Austl.).
64. Williams, supra note 27, at 18; see also LA NAUZE, supra note 12, at 232.
65. Goldfields Act 1895 (WA) ss 14 & 92 (Austl.); Goldfields Act (Amendment) Act 1898 (WA) s 4 (Austl.).
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about it, but still it is so. I do not want this clause to pass in a
shape which would undo what is about to be done in most of
the colonies, and what has already been done in Western Australia, in regard to that class of persons.66

Thus, the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the community and legislation of the Australian colonies exerted a significant influence on the drafting of the Australian Constitution.
For example, another delegate from Victoria, Isaac Isaacs (who
would be appointed a justice of the Australian High Court), told
the 1898 Convention that Clark’s amendment, which sought to
guarantee equal protection under the law, should be deleted because legislation in Victoria that regulated factories that discriminated against Chinese persons would be “void” if the Australian Constitution contained such a clause.67 As Williams persuasively states:
Clark’s amendment, based on the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution, was not rejected because it attempted to “establish personal liberty by constitutional restriction”, or that it inhabited the “democratic process”, or that
it was unacceptable because of its republican tarnish. Rather
it was expunged from the Draft Constitution on the basis of
race. To have adopted the Clark amendment would have limited the capacity of the federal and state governments to discriminate against persons of “undesirable races or of undesirable antecedence.”68

Like any other foundational document, the Australian Constitution was a product of its time. At least by contemporary standards, racism and discrimination were widespread at the time.69
66. Commonwealth, Convention Debates, Vol. 4, 8 Feb. 1898, 666 (Austl.),
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/constitution/conventions/18981104/upload_binary/1898_1104.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%22third%20session%22.
67. Id. at 687.
68. Williams, supra note 27, at 19 (citations omitted).
69. See HELEN IRVING, TO CONSTITUTE A NATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AUSTRALIA’S CONSTITUTION 100 (1999) (“Among the many models that were
tried on for the new nation, one was rejected outright. Australia, it was almost
universally agreed, must not be Chinese. It is hard now to appreciate fully
what was meant by this in the 1890s, and how absolutely necessary most people then believed it to be for the new nation to be ‘white’. Cartoons, caricatures
and purple prose images of Asians were drawn so crudely and repulsively, that
they represented now a barrier to understanding the imagination of the nineteenth century on this issue. The issue of ‘colour’ was unequivocally a racist
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These societal attitudes not only accounted for the deletion of
the formal guarantees of rights contained in the earlier drafts of
the Australian Constitution but also resulted in Section 51(xxvi),
which conferred power upon the Commonwealth Parliament to
legislate for “the people of any race, other than the aboriginal
race in any State, for whom it is deemed to make special laws.”70
These views also reflected the prevailing attitude toward indigenous Australians, which were expressed in Section 127: “In
reckoning the numbers of people of the Commonwealth, or of a
State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives
shall not be counted.”71 In this social and political milieu, it is
probably no surprise then that one of the first pieces of legislation enacted by the new Commonwealth Parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901.72 This law was the cornerstone
of the “White Australia” policy that ensured, so far as possible,
that migration to the new Commonwealth of Australia was limited to English-speaking Europeans and precluded Asians in
particular.73
Ultimately, the newly created commonwealth formally incorporated into its political and legal architecture this profound
Australian reluctance about formal rights guarantees.74 It

issue, but it was much more than this. As much as anything, it was a type of
cultural strategy in the processes of nation building.”); Raymond Evans, White
Citizenship: Nationhood and Race at Federation, in 2(2) MEMOIRS OF THE
QUEENSLAND MUSEUM: CULTURAL HERITAGE SERIES 179, 179 (2002).
70. Australian Constitution s 51; see QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 50, at 622
(“This sub-section does not refer to immigration; that is covered by sub-sec.
xxvii. It enables the Parliament to deal with the people of any alien race after
they have entered the Commonwealth; to localize them within defined areas,
to restrict their migration, to confine them to certain occupations, or to give
them special protection and secure their return after a certain period to the
country whence they came.”); Robert French, The Race Power: A Constitutional
Chimera, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 180–212 (H. P. Lee &
George Winterton eds., 2003).
71. In 1967, there was a national referendum that succeeded in amending
the Australian Constitution to remove the phrase “other than the aboriginal
race in any State” from Section 51 (xxvi) and to delete Section 127. See BAIN
ATTWOOD ET AL., THE 1967 REFERENDUM, OR WHEN ABORIGINES DIDN’T GET THE
VOTE (1997).
72. Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Austl.).
73. See A. C. PALFREEMAN, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WHITE AUSTRALIA
POLICY (1967).
74. See Charlesworth, supra note 55, at 196–201.
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forged a habit of mind in the Australian constitutional and political psyche that was (and arguably still is) characterized by
deep suspicion and skepticism of the notion of judicially enforced
rights entrenched in higher law.75
B. The Failure of Constitutional and Statutory Rights Reforms
The Australian reluctance about formal rights protection came
to the forefront in the two postfederation attempts to amend the
Australian Constitution, which sought to enshrine the sorts of
formal rights guarantees that were decisively rejected by the
framers. The first attempt occurred in 1944 as part of a constitutional package—the Constitutional Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Bill 1944—which aimed to
facilitate Australia’s reconstruction in the aftermath of World
War II.76 It sought to incorporate a constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression and to strengthen the existing establishment and free exercise of religion clauses.77 In general,
amending the Australian Constitution requires the agreement
of a double majority through a referendum: in other words, the
amendment must receive approval from a majority of voters nationally and a majority of voters in four of the six Australian

75. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Introduction, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT
RIGHTS: INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 2–3
(2006) (quoting the following passage written in 1955 by Gough Whitlam, a
future leader of the left-leaning Australian Labor Party and Prime Minister of
Australia from 1972–1975: “British history shows that Parliament has been
our great liberating force. Parliament has conferred political freedom on those
represented in it, first of all the barons and squires and then the merchants
and now all adults. . . . [W]e must have effective parliamentary government
and, accordingly, dispense with fetters on parliament rather than contrive
them. For every person whose liberty has been prejudiced by government action, there are many whose liberty has been enhanced. . . . The forum which
Parliament provides is the best guardian of our liberties. . . . The High Court .
. . is less representative of the Australian people than are their elected representatives. Judges are irresponsible in that they hold office for life, which is
sometimes a very long life. Some have used that asset for a political purpose. .
. . We are constrained by our present Federal Constitution to leave the final
disposition of many matters in the hands of lawyers. We are forbidden to do
not so much what the Constitution forbids us to do but what the judges forbid
us to do.”).
76. See WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 73.
77. See Brian Galligan, Australia’s Rejection of a Bill of Rights, 28 J.
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 344 (1990).
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states.78 The proposed 1944 amendment achieved neither of the
majorities needed for the bill to be passed.79
The second effort to amend the Australian Constitution occurred in 1988, which was considerably more ambitious but even
more spectacularly unsuccessful.80 The Constitutional Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) Bill 1988 sought to strengthen the
constitutional rights to jury trial, eminent domain, and (again)
the free exercise and establishment of religion clauses.81 The
proposal was supported by 31 percent of voters nationally (the
lowest level of support ever for a constitutional amendment proposal put to the Australian people) and did not secure a majority
in any of the states.82 As Charlesworth explains, these unsuccessful attempts to bolster the strength and status of constitutional rights in Australia underlines the significance of—and
long shadow cast by—the framers’ foundational decision to reject
formal rights guarantees:
The Australian suspicion of constitutionally entrenched rights
has been enduring. It has been supported by arguments that
constitutional rights could both politicize the judiciary and legalize public policy, thus undermining our legal culture. . . . At
a more fundamental level, reservations about rights are linked
to a utilitarian confidence in [the] existing governmental structure [of Australia].83

Over the years, this Australian reluctance about fundamental
human rights sunk even modest proposals to enact a statutory
bill of rights.84 For example, in 1973, the Australian government

78. Australian Constitution s 128; see James A. Thomson, Altering the Constitution: Some Aspects of Section 128, 13 FED. L. REV. 323 (1983).
79. Only two of six states achieved majority votes (Western Australia and
South Australia), and only 45.99 percent of the national population approved
the measure. See GEORGE WILLIAMS & DAVID HUME, PEOPLE POWER: THE
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE REFERENDUM IN AUSTRALIA 90–91 (2010).
80. See BRIAN GALLIGAN & JOHN R. NETHERCOTE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION AND THE 1988 REFERENDUMS (1989).
81. See Charlesworth, supra note 55, at 201.
82. See WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 90–91.
83. Charlesworth, supra note 55, at 201.
84. Id. at 205–10; PETER HAMILTON BAILEY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENTERPRISE
IN AUSTRALIA AND INTERNATIONALLY 144–52 (2009).
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sought, unsuccessfully, to enact in domestic legislation the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).85
The ICCPR provides for the protection at international law of
core civil and political rights, such as life, liberty, fair trial, nondiscrimination and freedom of association, assembly, religion
and speech. The signature and ratification of the ICCPR imposes
international law obligations regarding the protection of the enshrined rights and freedoms upon the acceding nation-state.86
But, in Australia, domestic legislation is required to give effect
to these international laws.87 In 1983, the government drafted
the Bill of Rights bill, which marked another attempt to enact
the ICCPR into domestic Australian law.88 The bill, however,
faced immediate political hostility and was never introduced
into the Commonwealth Parliament.89 More recently, a 2009 report by the National Human Rights Consultation Committee
(which was established and appointed by the Australian government) recommended90 that the Commonwealth Parliament enact a statutory bill of rights similar to those operating in other
comparable Commonwealth nations with parliamentary systems of government, such as New Zealand91 and the United
Kingdom.92 The same Australian Government rejected that recommendation with the enigmatic statement that it “believes
that the enhancement of human rights should be done in a way
that as far as possible unites, rather than divides, our community.”93 Instead, the government decided that enhanced parlia-

85. Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) (Austl.); see George Williams, Lionel Murphy and Democracy and Rights, in JUSTICE LIONEL MURPHY—INFLUENTIAL OR
MERELY PRESCIENT? 50 (Michael Coper & George Williams eds., 1997).
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
87. Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 480–81 (Austl.).
88. See Charlesworth, supra note 55, at 207–09.
89. See BAILEY, supra note 84, at 146–48; Charlesworth, supra note 55, at
207–10.
90. NAT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION COMM., NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
CONSULTATION
REPORT
(2009),
http://library.bsl.org.au/jspui/bitstream/1/1320/1/NHRC_Report.pdf.
91. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.).
92. Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.).
93. See HUMAN RIGHTS BRANCH, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, AUSTRALIA’S
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 1 (2010), https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Publicsubmissionsonthedraftbaselinestudy/AustraliasHumanRightsFramework.pdf.
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mentary scrutiny of proposed federal legislation was the appropriate mechanism to better protect and promote fundamental
human rights in Australian law. In response, the legislature enacted the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011. It
established the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human
Rights, which examines and reports to Parliament whether Australian bills are compatible with the seven international human
rights treaties to which Australia is a party.94
In any event, this void in the formal protection of fundamental
human rights in Australia ensured that, for much of the twentieth century, the constitutional vision of the framers—to place no
(fundamental human rights) fetters upon legislative action95—
would be realized. That framework for lawmaking ensured that
“within their respective constitutional boundaries [Commonwealth and State Parliaments] [we]re as sovereign as the UK
Parliament.”96 Not surprisingly, the unfettered scope of legislative power enjoyed by Australian Parliaments led to the enactment of legislation that seriously infringed upon fundamental
human rights. This was especially so and problematic during
wartime, when the rights to liberty, association, religious freedom, and freedom of speech of unpopular minorities were legislatively targeted.97
94. See Dan Meagher, The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act
2011 (Cth) and the Courts, 42 FED. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2014).
95. See Dixon, supra note 1, at 102; ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH: AN EXAMINATION OF THE GROWTH OF POWER IN
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 54 (1967).
96. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty and Statutory Interpretation, in THE STATUTE: MAKING AND MEANING 187, 187–88 (Rick Bigwood ed.,
2004).
97. See Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth
(1943) 67 CLR 116 (Austl.) (addressing an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to Regulation 3 of the National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations 1940, which gave the Commonwealth Government the extraordinary
power to declare anybody corporate or unincorporate as prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth and unlawful as a consequence). As another example, during the Cold War, the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950, sought
to ban the Communist Party and affiliated organizations and seriously limit
the civil liberties of persons whom the Commonwealth Government declared
were (potentially) dangerous communists. See George Winterton, The Communist Party Case, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS 108 (H. P. Lee
& George Winterton eds., 2003). The act was invalidated by the Australian
High Court on federalism grounds, namely the absence of federal legislative
power to support it. Austl Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1
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III. THE NEW JUDICIAL RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AUSTRALIA
A combination of current and former legislative developments
that began in the 1980s inspired the courts to fill the formal
rights lacuna in Australia in an effort to resist laws that were
increasingly and openly hostile to fundamental human rights.
They have done so by, amongst other things, developing a strong
clear statement rule for fundamental human rights—now
termed the “principle of legality”—from the old common law
canon that also had its roots in early nineteenth century U.S.
law.
There can be little doubt, however, as to the significance of the
rise of fundamental human rights as a core concern of the international legal order in the aftermath of World War II.98 It swiftly
led to the creation of the United Nations in 194599 and the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948.100 The ICCPR101 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,102 which were adopted and
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by the U.N.
General Assembly in December 1966, further established the international law of human rights. Australia ratified both treaties
in 1980, which provided the courts with a human rights touchstone and an “updated set of values”103 from which to adjust common law rules and develop more rights-sensitive principles of
statutory interpretation.104
(Austl.). The Australian High Court thus always had the power to review (and
invalidate) legislation for offending the structural and federal provisions of the
Australian Constitution. See Adrienne Stone, Judicial Review Without Rights:
Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review,
28 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD 1 (2008).
98. See CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? 25–28 (2006); Michael
Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS
AND IDOLATRY 3–52 (Amy Gutman ed., 2001).
99. See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 133–35 (3d ed. 2008).
100. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
2948).
101. ICCPR, supra note 86.
102. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
103. Claudia Geiringer, The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A
Critical Examination of R v Hansen, 6 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT. L. 59, 89 (2008).
104. See David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt, & Michael Taggart, The Principle
of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 5, 32–33 (2001).
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Around the same time, in the aftermath of the 1983 election,
newly elected Prime Minister Bob Hawke held a National
Crimes Conference to consider and tackle the new challenges
posed by organized and sophisticated forms of crime.105 It led to
the establishment of Australia’s first standing crime commission
in 1984—the National Crime Authority—which was responsible
for investigating and gathering intelligence on tax evasion and
organized crime for the benefit of prosecuting authorities.106
During this time, states also established similar (sometimes ad
hoc) bodies tailored to the investigation of organized criminal activity because they considered traditional law enforcement powers and techniques inadequate.107 In order to undertake their
functions, legislators granted these national and state crime
commissions investigative powers, including the power to compel persons under the threat of penalties to answer questions
under oath, even when those answers might incriminate
them.108 As Justice Mark Weinberg recently noted, these compulsory investigative powers are far more extensive than those
usually available to the police.109 Whilst this legislation, and the
powers it conferred, was controversial, the absence of formally
entrenched rights guarantees in the Australian Constitution—
such as the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
protects against self-incrimination—prevented the legislation
from being held unconstitutional.110
In a trio of cases decided between 1987 and 1992, the Australian High Court began to apply its common law interpretive powers to protect, where possible, fundamental human rights from
105. See STEPHEN DONAGHUE, ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND PERMANENT COMMISSIONS

OF INQUIRY 5–8 (2001).

106. National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.); see also C. T. Corns,
The National Crime Authority: An Evaluation, 13 CRIM. L.J. 233 (1989).
107. See Justice Mark Weinberg, Supreme Court of New South Wales Annual
Conference: The Impact of Special Commissions of Inquiry/Crime Commissions on Criminal Trials 2–6 (Aug. 1, 2014), http://assets.justice.vic.gov.au/supreme/resources/66d960d7-4dae-4b13-853c-71a94e97a424/the+impact+of+special+commissions+of+inquiry+weinberg+j+-+1+aug+2014.pdf.
108. National Crime Authority Act 1984; Independent Commission Against
Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) (Austl.); see also DONAGHUE, supra note 105, at 59–
72.
109. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 2–3.
110. Balog v Ind Comm Against Corruption (1990) 169 CLR 625 (Austl.); see
W. G. Roser, The Independent Commission Against Corruption: The New Star
Chamber?, 16 CRIM. L.J. 225 (1992).
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legislative destruction.111 At a time when common law “judges
approached legislation as some kind of foreign intrusion,”112 the
Australian High Court dusted off an old interpretive canon (with
U.S. roots113) from one of its early decisions. In 1908, the Australian High Court applied this canon to the construction of the
word “immigrant” in Section 3 of the Immigration Restriction
Act 1901 to protect the right of an Australian-born member of
the community to reenter the country after a period of absence:
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would
overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart
from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to
general words, simply because they have that meaning in their
widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a
meaning in which they were not really used.114

The Australian High Court then refashioned the content (and
normative justification) for this fundamental human rights
canon in its now seminal decision Coco v. The Queen.115 The contemporary justification emphasizes the salutary role the canon
can play when legislators are given clear and prior notice of the
common law rights backdrop against which their legislation will
be construed. This may improve the clarity and rights sensitivity
of legislation-promoting democracy and rule-of-law values in the
process.116 And it is the judicial insistence that Parliament must
consider and then decide whether its legislation infringes upon
fundamental human rights that is the lynchpin of the canon—
now termed the principle of legality—and its rights-protective
capacity. The Australian High Court’s following statement
makes this clear:
The insistence on express authorization of an abrogation or
curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity must
be understood as a requirement for some manifestation or indication that the legislature has not only directed its attention
to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of such basic
111. Re Bolton (1987) 162 CLR 514 (Austl.); Bropho v Western Australia
(1990) 171 CLR 1 (Austl.); Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 (Austl.).
112. R v Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10, 23 (Austl.).
113. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 390 (1805); see infra Part V.
114. Potter v Minihan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (Austl.) (citations omitted).
115. Coco 179 CLR at 427, 437, 446.
116. See Brendan Lim, The Normativity of the Principle of Legality, 37 MELB.
U. L. REV. 372, 389–94 (2013).
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rights, freedoms or immunities but has also determined upon
abrogation or curtailment of them. The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language. General words will
rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they do not specifically
deal with the question because, in the context in which they
appear, they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights.117

Rather than discovering authentic legislative intention, which
was clearly the original justification for the canon, these notions
suggest that using clear statement to protect fundamental human rights now underpins the contemporary canon.118 The trio
of cases that followed then vigorously applied the contemporary
manifestation of the canon to protect the fundamental common
law rights to liberty119 and property120 from legislative encroachment.
Even more significant from a contemporary perspective, the
Australian High Court then used international human rights
law to expand the catalogue of rights and freedoms it sought to
protect through the application of the principle of legality. This

117. Coco 179 CLR at 427, 437, 446.
118. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES 308–09 (2010); Lim, supra note 116, at 413 (“Despite an outward appearance of continuity, the contemporary principle of legality is not the same
as the rule in Potter v Minahan. They differ not simply in content and scope,
but in their basic constitutional justification. The rule originally rested upon a
claim, positive in character, that Parliament would not intend to abrogate common law rights. That central claim is descriptively false in the conditions of
the modern activist state. To preserve the principle of legality, the courts have
transformed its justification. There have been two distinct and parallel strategies to accommodate the change. The first is a positive refinement: though it
cannot be said that an activist legislature would not intend to abrogate common law rights generally, it can be said that it would not intend to abrogate
‘fundamental’ common law rights. The second is a normative refinement: irrespective of parliament’s authentic legislative intention (and irrespective of
whether there can be such a thing), courts should attribute a legislative intention not to abrogate rights, because to do so would enable or enhance mechanisms of political accountability and electoral discipline that are seen to be
proper incidents of our system of representative and responsible government.”).
119. Re Bolton (1987) 162 CLR 514 (Austl.).
120. Coco 179 CLR at 427.
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expansion went beyond the common law’s holy trinity of life, liberty, and property to include, for example, religious equality121
and freedom of speech.122 In doing so, senior appellate judges in
Australia aligned themselves with important common law developments in the protection of rights occurring in the United Kingdom (another common law country that lacked a bill of rights or
even (most famously) a written constitution).123 In his influential
article, The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights, Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed:
If it were to be held that general statutory powers were presumed not to interfere with human rights unless Parliament
expressly or by necessary implication has so authorized, for
most practical purposes the common law would provide protection to the individual at least equal to that provided by the [European Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.)]. . . . Even
though the E.C.H.R forms no part of our law, it contains a
statement of fundamental human rights (accepted by this
country) much wider than the freedoms of the person and of
property which have, of late, become the only rights afforded
special treatment by our courts. We must come to treat these
wider freedoms on the same basis and afford to freedom of
speech, for example, the same importance as we have afforded
to freedom of the person.124

Finally, in the early 1990s, the Australian High Court began
to treat the few express rights in the Australian Constitution
seriously125 and derived implied constitutional rights to democratic participation and due process.126 Relevant here, the Australian High Court implied from the text and structure of the
121. Canterbury Mun Council v Moslem Alawy Soc’y Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR
525, 544 (Austl.); see Kevin Boreham, International Law as an Influence on the
Development of the Common Law: Evans v New South Wales, 19 PUB. L. REV.
271 (2008).
122. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 31 (Austl.); Evans v
New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 (Austl.).
123. See Sir Anthony Mason, Courts, Constitutions and Fundamental Rights,
in LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL
OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 273–88 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997).
124. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights, PUB. L. 397,
408–09 (1992).
125. See Michael Detmold, The New Constitutional Law, 16 SYD. L. REV. 228
(1994); WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 107–10.
126. See George Winterton, The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied
Bill of Rights, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR LESLIE ZINES 185–208 (Geoffrey Lindell ed.,
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Australian Constitution the following rights and freedoms: a
right to freedom of political expression,127 a right to due process
in both federal and state court proceedings,128 a right to vote in
federal elections,129 an entrenched minimal level of judicial review in federal administrative law,130 and an entrenched minimum level of judicial review in state administrative law.131 The
rights to freedom of political expression and to vote in federal
elections were implied from the text of Sections 7 and 24 of the
Australian Constitution, which provide that members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall be “directly chosen” by the people of the “State” and the “Commonwealth” respectively.132 In this way, the Australian High Court held that
the Australian system of representative government established
by these provisions is a constitutional concept that, for its effective operation, requires freedom of political expression133 and a
franchise for all adult citizens, unless there is a substantial reason for excluding them.134 The rights to due process and entrenched minimum levels of judicial review in federal and state
administrative law, on the other hand, were implied from the
strong separation of judicial power from the political arms of
government that was established by Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. For example, Section 71 vests “judicial power”
in federal courts and such other courts as the Commonwealth
Parliament chooses to vest with federal jurisdiction.135 As a consequence, the Australian High Court has held that “[j]udicial
1994); Fiona Wheeler, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia, 23 MONASH U. L. REV. 248 (1997);
Graeme Orr & George Williams, The People’s Choice: The Prisoner Franchise
and the Constitutional Protection of Voting Rights in Australia, 8 ELECTION
L.J. 123 (2009).
127. Austl Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106
(Austl.).
128. Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 (Austl.); South
Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 (Austl.).
129. Roach v Electoral Comm’r (2007) 233 CLR 162 (Austl.).
130. Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Austl.).
131. Kirk v Indus Relations Comm’n of NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531 (Austl.).
132. Austl Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 177 CLR at 106.
133. Lange v Austl Broad Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559–60 (Austl.).
134. Rowe v Electoral Comm’r (2010) 243 CLR 1, 18–19 (Austl.).
135. Section 71 states: “The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be
vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia,
and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other
courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a
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power involves the application of the relevant law to facts as
found in proceedings in accordance with the judicial process.
And that requires that the parties be given an opportunity to
present their evidence and to challenge the evidence against
them.”136 Further, Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution
entrenches a minimum level of judicial review in federal administrative law by conferring on the Australian High Court original
jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.137 That entrenched judicial review jurisdiction has
been extended by the Australian High Court to state administrative law due to Chapter III (and Section 73 specifically) of the
Australian Constitution, which expressly contemplates that
state courts will exercise federal jurisdiction.138 As a result,
these constitutional rights developments were not only significant in their own right but also buttressed and inspired the protection of extant common law rights to fair trial, due process,
and access to courts from legislative encroachment.139
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AS A CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
AND A COMMON LAW BILL OF RIGHTS
In the absence of an entrenched Australian Bill of Rights—and
faced with new kinds of rights-infringing legislation—the Australian High Court turned to alternative legal sources—international law, common law, and indigenous constitutional law—to
develop a set of rules and interpretive principles that could provide more robust protection of fundamental human rights. The
courts recognized their capacity (if not constitutional responsibility) to protect fundamental human rights whenever interpretively possible. This laid the normative and doctrinal foundation
upon which the courts would construct a quasiconstitutional
Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than two, as the Parliament
prescribes.” Australian Constitution s 71.
136. Bass v Permanent Tr Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Austl.).
137. Section 75(v) is the constitutional provision included at the urging of
Clark to address the mandamus/original jurisdiction issue in Marbury v. Madison.
138. Kirk 239 CLR at 531.
139. See Chief Justice Robert French, Speech at the Anglo Australian Lawyers Society: The Common Law and the Protection of Human Rights (Sept. 4,
2009),
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj4sep09.pdf; Mason, supra note 123, at 283–86.
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common law bill of rights.140 It would do so to resist another
tranche of federal legislation that seriously infringed fundamental human rights. The methodological tool used was the old common law canon—now rebadged as the principle of legality141—
which would develop into a strong Australian clear statement
rule.
A. Migration Policy and Fundamental Human Rights
Since the early 2000s, Australia’s migration policy has been
characterized by the successive and ongoing legislative attempts
of Australian governments to seriously limit and sometimes exclude the rights to liberty, natural justice, and court access of
persons seeking asylum—especially those arriving by boat.142
The policy now involves intercepting the boats at sea and taking
those on board to offshore centers in small Pacific nations, such
as Nauru and Papua New Guinea for processing.143 The Australian government stated that no one seeking to migrate in this
manner would be resettled in Australia and further sought to
remove the ability of asylum seekers to challenge the legality of
140. See JAMES J. SPIGELMAN, The Application of Quasi-Constitutional Laws,
in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 86–97 (2008). It is fascinating to note here that in 1939, Professor Willis outlined strikingly similar interpretive (and constitutional) developments occurring in Canada where, in the
absence of a bill of rights or even a constitutional separation of powers, the
courts used their interpretive powers to establish a common law bill of rights.
John Willis, Administrative Law and the British North America Act, 53 HARV.
L. REV. 251, 274 (1939).
141. Sir Philip Sales explains that “the principle of legality” is the odd name
used by Halsbury’s Laws—and subsequently adopted by Lord Steyn in R. v
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Simms—for the doctrine
that fundamental human rights and principles at common law are not overridden by statute unless done so expressly or by necessary implication. Sir Philip
Sales, A Comparison of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human
Rights Act 1998, 125 L. QUART. REV. 598, 600 (2009). The terminology was first
used in Australian law in Electrolux Home Prod Pty Ltd v Austl Workers’ Union
(2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 (Austl.).
142. See JANE MCADAM & FIONA CHONG, REFUGEES: WHY SEEKING ASYLUM IS
LEGAL AND AUSTRALIA’S POLICIES ARE NOT (2014).
143. See Mary Crock & Daniel Ghezelbash, Due Process and Rule of Law as
Human Rights: The High Court and the “Offshore” Processing of Asylum Seekers, 18 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 101, 101–14 (2011); Australia: ‘Pacific Solution’ Redux—New Refugee Law Discriminatory, Arbitrary, Unfair, Inhumane, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/17/australiapacific-solution-redux.
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relevant migration decisions made upon processing.144 This triggered a steady flow of migration cases (which now resembles a
flood) that were heard by the Australian High Court. In these
cases, Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution loomed large.
To recall, Section 75(v) provides that “[i]n all matters . . . in
which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is
sought against an officer of the Commonwealth . . . the High
Court shall have original jurisdiction.”145 It provides both the legal avenue to the Australian High Court (which trumped a federal statute that sought to exclude this access to asylum seekers
who wished to challenge the migration decisions of the Australian government146) and the constitutional vehicle used by the
court to develop the entrenched grounds upon which that review
and relief is sought.147
In Plaintiff S157 v. Commonwealth—a 2003 case in which the
Australian High Court strictly construed Section 474 of the Migration Act 1958, which sought to oust its review powers of migration decisions—Chief Justice Gleeson stated that Section
75(v) of the Australian Constitution “secures a basic element of
the rule of law. The jurisdiction of the Court to require officers
of the Commonwealth to act within the law cannot be taken
away by Australian Parliament.”148 Subject to the Australian
Constitution, the Parliament may, of course, change the content
of the statute, but the rule of law requires that the executive
government obey the law.149

144. See Jane McAdam, Australia and Asylum Seekers, 25 INT. J. REFUGEE L.
435, 440 (2013).
145. Australian Constitution s 75(v); see MARK ARONSON & MATTHEW GROVES,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 949–56 (5th ed. 2013); Leighton
McDonald, The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the
Rule of Law, 21 PUB. L. REV. 14 (2010); Simon Young & Sarah Murray, An
Elegant Convergence? The Constitutional Entrenchment of “Jurisdictional Error” Review in Australia, 11 OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 117 (2011).
146. Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Austl.); see
Cheryl Saunders, Plaintiff S157/2002: A Case Study in Common Law Constitutionalism, 12 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 115 (2005).
147. See Will Bateman, The Constitution and the Substantive Principles of
Judicial Review: The Full Scope of the Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review, 39 FED. L. REV. 463 (2011); David F. Jackson, Development of
Judicial Review over the Last 10 Years: The Growth of Constitutional Writs, 12
AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 22 (2004).
148. Plaintiff S157/2002 211 CLR at 476, 482.
149. MURRAY GLEESON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 68 (2000).
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Yet, as to whether Section 474 authorized the executive government to make migration decisions without according natural
justice (or due process of law) to those persons affected, Chief
Justice Gleeson emphatically stated:
[C]ourts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail fundamental rights or freedoms unless such an
intention is clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that
purpose. What courts will look for is a clear indication that the
legislature has directed its attention to the rights or freedoms
in question, and has consciously decided upon abrogation or
curtailment. As Lord Hoffmann recently pointed out in the
United Kingdom, for Parliament squarely to confront such an
issue may involve a political cost, but in the absence of express
language or necessary implication, even the most general
words are taken to be “subject to the basic rights of the individual.”
The principles of statutory construction stated above lead to
the conclusion that Parliament has not evinced an intention
that a decision by the Tribunal to confirm a refusal of a protection visa, made unfairly, and in contravention of the requirements of natural justice, shall stand so long as it was a bona
fide attempt to decide whether or not such a visa should be
granted. Decision-makers, judicial or administrative, may be
found to have acted unfairly even though their good faith is not
in question. People whose fundamental rights are at stake are
ordinarily entitled to expect more than good faith. They are ordinarily entitled to expect fairness. If Parliament intends to
provide that decisions of the Tribunal, although reached by an
unfair procedure, are valid and binding, and that the law does
not require fairness on the part of the Tribunal in order for its
decisions to be effective under the Act, then [Section] 474 does
not suffice to manifest such an intention.150

In the teeth of federal migration legislation—the ordinary meaning of which clearly and intentionally infringed upon rights—the
Australian High Court deployed the Australian Constitution
and the revitalized (old) common law canon, now called the prin-

150. Plaintiff S157/2002 211 CLR at 476, 492–94.
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ciple of legality, to protect the fundamental human rights of asylum seekers who sought natural justice and access to the
courts.151
In 2004, these developments gathered apace. In another migration case, this time involving an ultimately unsuccessful
challenge to compulsory and open-ended executive detention of
asylum seekers, Chief Justice Gleeson, once again, emphasized
the link between the principle of legality and the rule of law:
A statement concerning the improbability that Parliament
would abrogate fundamental rights by the use of general or
ambiguous words is not a factual prediction, capable of being
verified or falsified by a survey of public opinion. In a free society, under the rule of law, it is an expression of a legal value,
respected by the courts, and acknowledged by the courts to be
respected by Parliament.152

This contemporary migration law jurisprudence demonstrates
the willingness of the Australian High Court to apply the principle of legality to read down statutes that facially operate to seriously infringe fundamental rights close to the judicial heart
such as liberty, due process, and access to the courts.
B. The Recognition and Development of U.S. Notions of Clear
Statement
In 2005, Chief Justice Spigelman of the New South Wales Supreme Court published an important paper—Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle153—that, for the first time,
expressly drew the link between Australian common law and
U.S. notions of clear statement rules. Significantly, Chief Justice
Spigelman argued that the interpretive approach involved in the
application of the principle of legality in Australia should more
appropriately be called “the clear statement principle.”154 This
151. Id. at 476, 482, 505–20; see also Willis, supra note 140, at 272–81 (articulating the pre-Charter interpretive developments in Canada, where the
courts used (and developed) principles of statutory interpretation to secure the
right to access the courts in the heart of legislation whose aim was clearly to
the contrary).
152. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 577 (Austl.). But see WILLIAMS &
HUME, supra note 46, at 38, for an excellent critique of the “rule of law” justification for the principle of legality.
153. J. Spigelman, Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle,
79 AUSTL. L.J. 769 (2005).
154. SPIGELMAN, supra note 140, at 88.
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was so because it “more accurately reflect[ed] the true judicial
role”155 when determining whether or not the principle of legality
can be applied to the construction of a statute. As Chief Justice
Spigelman pointed out: “If Parliament wishes to interfere where
rights, liberties and expectations are affected, it must do so with
clarity. The clear statement principle is the critical way that the
law of statutory interpretation reflects and implements the principle of legality.”156
As Chief Justice Spigelman noted, in the United States, there
has long been “a clear interaction between constitutional and
quasi-constitutional principles,”157 and a collection of substantive interpretive canons known as “clear statement rules” facilitated this interaction.158 It is said that clear statement rules can
secure robust protection of individual rights in a manner that
enhances both legislative clarity159 and democratic government160 and can also promote constitutional and other important
legal values.161 The Australian High Court believes that the
principle of legality can perform a similar rights-protective, democracy-enhancing role and, further, can be used as the primary
means for the judicial protection of rights in a jurisdiction that
lacks a bill of rights.162 In terms of the methodology of clear
statement rules, Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett explain their rule-like operation as follows:
If a presumption of statutory meaning is sufficiently powerful,
it can rise to the level of a clear statement rule. . . . In such
instances, the Court is announcing a rule of law: in the absence
of clear statutory text speaking to the precise issue, judges
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 89–90.
158. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593 (1992).
159. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
160. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
289–97 (1994).
161. See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 158, at 595–98; Ernest A. Young,
The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for
Phil Frickey, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (2010).
162. See Chief Justice Robert French, Speech at John Marshall Law School:
Protecting Human Rights Without a Bill of Rights (Jan. 26, 2010),
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj26jan10.pdf.
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must interpret the statute a certain way. Sometimes the courts
impose such a stringent requirement of statutory textual clarity as to require the legislature to draft statutes with highly
targeted text containing what amounts to “magic language” if
the legislature wishes to overcome the canon. For example,
Congress is well advised, after Nordic Village, to include such
language as “the sovereign immunity of the United States is
hereby waived” in its statutes in addition to more general language indicating that the government is amenable to suit. Such
steroidal canons dictating special language might be labeled
super-strong clear statement rules.163

These clear statement rules are strictly applied to the construction of statutes to protect principles and values, such as federalism, due process, and the separation of powers, that have a common law, statutory, or constitutional source.164 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr demonstrates the interpretive bite that these rules can have when a statute engages
core concerns and values of the courts and the judicial process
(i.e., liberty, access to the courts, and the rule of law). In St. Cyr,
the court addressed congressional legislation that, in its ordinary or natural meaning, deprived criminal aliens habeas corpus review of a deportation order.165 Both the title of the relevant
provisions at issue—the Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus—and its detailed legislative history confirm that
U.S. Congress intended to repeal habeas corpus review in the
courts.166 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held otherwise:
For the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] to prevail it
must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial
review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. . . . Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction;
instead, [U.S.] Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous directives to effect a repeal.167

163. ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 354–55 (emphasis
added).
164. See id. at 352–55.
165. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 401(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
166. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 329 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted).
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The clear statement rule required that U.S. Congress use unambiguous language—“magic language”—to trump the relevant
rights and freedoms at issue in the ordinary and natural meaning of the statute; thus, “in the absence of clear statutory text
speaking to the precise issue,”168 the language of the statute required the U.S. Supreme Court to construe the statute in St. Cyr
in a rights-protective way. This amounts to a mandatory rule of
interpretation that makes fundamental human rights (as discovered and defined by the judiciary) strongly resistant to legislative abrogation.169
The contemporary jurisprudence of the Australian High Court
demonstrates the parallel between (and inspiration behind) the
methodology of clear statement rules and the principle of legality.170 Australian judges proceed from the interpretive premise
that a statute does not disturb or infringe the relevant set of
rights and freedoms considered fundamental at common law.
This first interpretive step is the critical one: the judicial identification of the right or freedom that is engaged upon an ordinary
construction of the relevant statute. Once this is done—and absent unmistakably clear statutory language (“magic language”)
to the contrary—the principle of legality is applied and the legislation is given a rights-protective construction. The Australian
High Court made it clear in Coco that judges must construe legislation compatibly with fundamental human rights, unless the
terms of the statute unambiguously state that “the legislature
has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms or immunities
but has also determined upon abrogation or curtailment of

168. ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 354.
169. It was, however, a conception of the interpretive requirement that the
clear statement rule mandated, which was strongly disputed in dissent by Justice Scalia. He argued that U.S. Congress does not have to use express or
“magic words” to rebut the strong (rights) presumption, so long as that intent
is clear on the face of the statute. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327, 333–34 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., & O’Connor, J.) (original emphasis).
170. Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573 (Austl.); see Dan Meagher, The
Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems, 36
SYD. L. REV. 413, 424–29 (2014).
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them.”171 The common law rights to liberty,172 property,173 free
speech,174 natural justice,175 access to the courts,176 and even the
defining characteristics of our “general system of law,” are thus
protected from legislative encroachment by this application of
rule-like conception of the principle of legality.177
Another migration case, Saeed v. Minister for Immigration
and Citizenship, demonstrates how the principle of legality
hardened into a strong Australian species of clear statement
rules and the significance of this development for the protection
of fundamental human rights. The applicant was refused a visa
on the grounds that his application contained false or misleading
information regarding his work history in Pakistan.178 The Minister for Immigration obtained that information through inquiries made by her delegate but did not draw this information to
the appellant’s attention before her decision to refuse the visa.179
On the facts, the right engaged on the ordinary meaning of the
statute was the natural justice hearing rule. The court held that
“in the ordinary case, an opportunity should be given to a person
affected by a decision to deal with any adverse information that
is ‘credible, relevant and significant’”180 before that decision is
made. The relevant provisions in the Migration Act 1958 contained “an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing in relation to the matters they deal with”181
(which the court held related to onshore visa applicants). The
common law right was abrogated for these onshore visa applicants, as the statute did not expressly require the Minister for

171. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Austl.).
172. Re Bolton (1987) 162 CLR 514, 523 (Austl.).
173. R & R Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (2009) 237 CLR 603,
619 (Austl.).
174. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 31 (Austl.); Evans v
New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576, 595–96 (Austl.).
175. Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252,
271 (Austl.).
176. Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Austl.).
177. X7 v Austl Crime Comm’n (2013) 248 CLR 92, 595–96, 612–13 (Austl.);
Lee v New South Wales Crime Comm’n (2013) 251 CLR 196, 233–37, 265–71
(Austl.).
178. Saeed 241 CLR at 257.
179. Id. at 256.
180. Id. at 261.
181. Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 51A(1) (Austl.).
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Immigration to give them an opportunity to address relevant adverse information (though, in her discretion, the minister did invite them to do so).182 This had the effect of abrogating the right
to a natural justice hearing for onshore visa applicants. And although there was ample legislative history that suggested that
the provisions were intended to cover all visa applicants (onshore and offshore), as was the case in St. Cyr, the Australian
High Court held that these materials were not interpretively decisive.183 In doing so, the court rejected the notion that legislative
history, even if clear and emphatic, can trump its primary interpretive duty—which is to ascertain the meaning of the statute
through close consideration of its text.184 Consequently, the relevant provisions were interpreted in the following terms:
Assuming, for present purposes, that [Section] 51A as it applies
to [Section] 57, is valid and effective to exclude the natural justice hearing rule, it is excluded only so far as concerns onshore
visa applicants. . . . The position of offshore visas is not addressed. . . . It follows that [upon the application of the principle
of legality] the implication of the natural justice hearing rule
with respect to offshore visa applicants was maintained. The
Minister was obliged to provide the appellant with an opportunity to answer adverse material.185

182. Id. s 56.
183. Saeed 241 CLR at 264–65, 271.
184. Id. at 264–65; see Matthew Groves, Exclusion of the Rules of Natural
Justice, 39 MONASH U. L. REV. 285, 290–91 (2013) (“Saeed also appeared to
identify a deeper common law foundation for the presumptions surrounding
natural justice when it explained that natural justice was one of the ‘fundamental principles’ protected by the principle of legality. . . . The principle of
legality may be supported by longstanding authority, but any notion that observance of the rules of natural justice is an implied condition or requirement
that is necessary for the valid exercise of statutory powers has a much more
recent origin. Justice Basten has conceded that the implication of a condition
to observe the requirements of fairness as a valid precondition to the exercise
of statutory powers ‘has a degree of artificiality.’ . . . This . . . highlights a difficult point for the courts. The implication process used by the courts involves
two competing issues. On the one hand, in this exercise the courts purport to
ascertain and enforce the ‘true intention’ of Parliament. On the other hand,
they do so through a process of common law assumptions and statutory interpretation so obscure as to raise the question of whether the intention finally
discovered is as much, if not more, a judicial rather than a parliamentary
one.”).
185. Saeed 241 CLR at 271.
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This curial insistence that Parliament first consider and then
decide whether its legislation infringes upon a fundamental
right is the lynchpin of the principle of legality. Justices Gummow and Bell emphatically endorsed this proposition in the recent Australian High Court case, Plaintiff M47 v. Director General of Security, where it held that the Migration Act 1958 “does
not provide in terms that an unlawful non-citizen is to be kept in
immigration detention permanently or indefinitely.”186 The
court held that the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958
only authorized the detention of unlawful noncitizens until they
were either deported, granted a visa, or removed (at their request) to another country.187 The act did not expressly contemplate the possibility of indefinite detention of an unlawful
noncitizen. In other words, Parliament did not “squarely confront” and then decide—using clear statutory language—to express the decision to abrogate the fundamental common law
right to liberty for unlawful noncitizens seeking asylum.188
In this series of migration cases, the principle of legality operated as a “kind of manner and form requirement imposed on Parliament”189 that necessitated “clear and unequivocal [statutory]
language”190 in order to interfere with fundamental human
rights. This suggests that, in Australia (as in the United States),
the Australian High Court “announc[ed] a rule of law: in the absence of clear statutory text speaking to the precise issue, judges
must interpret the statute a certain way.”191 In this sense, the
principle of legality has developed into a strong Australian species of clear statement rule for fundamental human rights.192
186. Plaintiff M47-2012 v Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1, 59,
188–93 (Austl.) (emphasis added); see Claire McKay, Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security: Where to Now for Al-Kateb?, 24 PUB. L. REV. 3
(2013).
187. Plaintiff M47-2012 251 CLR at 59, 193.
188. Id.
189. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 118, at 311.
190. Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46 (Austl.).
191. ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 354.
192. Interestingly, this evolution from a principle of legality into a clear
statement rule for common law rights and freedoms reflects the process of convergence suggested by Professor Frederick Schauer: that, as an empirical matter, the behavior of rule-interpreters and rule-enforcers suggests that standards will be developed into rules, and that rules will be pushed toward standards. Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z.
L. REV. 303, 305 (2003).
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The significance is that the robust application of the principle
now transcends what in Australia were a historically loose collection of rebuttable presumptions193—with their origins as specific rules and immunities,194 residual freedoms,195 and aspirational judicial values196—and has formed a common law bill of
rights that is resistant to legislative encroachment, maybe even
defiantly so.197
193. For example, these presumptions include that legislation is not to have
extraterritorial effect; legislation does not alter the common law; legislation is
constitutional; legislation does not operate with retrospective effect; legislation
does not limit the prerogative powers of the Crown; and legislation does not
interfere with equality of religion or violate the rules of international law. See
D. C. PEARCE & R. S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 255–
59 (8th ed. 2014); J. J. Doyle, Common Law Rights and Democratic Rights, in
1 ESSAYS ON LAW AND GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 144–67 (Paul D.
Finn ed., 1995).
194. Relevantly, Justice Gummow observes:
[T]o speak of “fundamental” common law “principles” assumes a level at which these are abstracted but offers little
guidance as to the location of that level. Many rights and immunities are reduced by the general law to specific and justiciable principles and remedies; the rule respecting legal professional privilege and the protection of the “Englishman’s
castle” against intrusion by the Executive through the action
for trespass and the setting aside of “general warrants” are
examples; but a general principle or “value” respecting, say,
equality before the law, may be another matter.
W. M. C. Gummow, The Constitution: Ultimate Foundation of Australian
Law?, 79 AUSTL. L.J. 167, 176–77 (2005) (citations omitted).
195. See BAILEY, supra note 84, at 19 (noting that a common law “freedom” is
not like a human rights-type claim or action, but rather it emerges as a general
principle from a line of sufficiently similar individual cases).
196. In 2004, Professor Paul Rishworth noted that the traditional use of
“common law rights” in legal argument was aspirational where the “rights”
asserted were in fact desirable goals, not a clearly defined baseline against
which to assess the legality of legislation and government action. Paul Rishworth, Common Law Rights and Navigation Lights: Judicial Review and the
New Zealand Bill of Rights, 15 PUB. L. REV. 103, 106 (2004).
197. Professor Goldsworthy observes that, arguably,
the courts have waged a stealthy, and ultimately successful,
campaign to acquire – or usurp – authority to protect “constitutional” values of their choice, by imposing a kind of manner
and form requirement on Parliament. . . . For example, in a
jurisdiction lacking a statutory Bill of Rights, the courts
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C. A Common Law Bill of Rights
It was no surprise then that in a series of lectures delivered in
2008 by Chief Justice Spigelman on the topic of statutory interpretation and fundamental human rights,198 the first was titled,
The Common Law Bill of Rights.199 In the lectures, he detailed
how the progressive transformation from the old common law
canon to the principle of legality, through the methodology of
clear statement, gave the Australian Bill of Rights quasiconstitutional strength.200 The suite of rights, freedoms, and immunities that comprise this bill of rights was said to include the following:201 nonretrospectivity,202 personal liberty,203 freedom of
movement,204 freedom of speech,205 fair trial,206 access to the

might introduce one “through the back door”, by developing a
common law bill of rights that protects the same rights as a
statutory bill and provides the same level of protection.
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 118, at 311 (citations omitted).
198. These were the 2008 McPherson Lectures presented at the University
of Queensland TC Bierne School of Law. See SPIGELMAN, supra note 10.
199. Id. at 1–50. The other lectures were The Application of Quasi-Constitutional Laws, id. at 51–98, and Legitimate and Spurious Interpretation, id. at
99–145.
200. Id. at 86–97; see WILLIAMS & HUME, supra note 46, at 43–44 (noting that,
after detailing the catalogue of rights, freedoms, and principles that constitute
the “common law bill of rights,” the authors stated that this demonstrated the
breadth of the principle of legality. But, its depth is also apparent, as its application does not require statutory ambiguity, and it trumps other textual and
structural presumptions that may otherwise be interpretively relevant in particular legislative contexts).
201. SPIGELMAN, supra note 10, at 27–29; see PEARCE & GEDDES, supra note
193, at 255–59; Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 177–78 (Austl.); see
also French, supra note 139, at 3–4.
202. See Esber v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 430 (Austl.); Rodway v The
Queen (1990) 169 CLR 515 (Austl.).
203. See Re Bolton (1987) 162 CLR 514 (Austl.).
204. See Melbourne Corp v Barry (1922) 31 CLR 174 (Austl.); Potter v Minihan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (Austl.).
205. See Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 31 (Austl.); Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576, 594–96 (Austl.); see also Dan
Meagher, The Principle of Legality and the Judicial Protection of Rights—Evans v New South Wales, 37 FED. L. REV. 295 (2009).
206. Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 (Austl.).
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courts,207 open justice,208 lenity,209 natural justice and due process of law,210 property,211 and freedom and equality of religion.212
The content of this bill of rights is now routinely endorsed by
senior appellate courts in Australia,213and its expansion, though
slow and incremental,214 is being hastened by the influence of
Australian constitutional law principle215 and the interaction between international law on fundamental human rights and domestic law.216
In a speech delivered in 2010 at John Marshall Law School in
Chicago titled, Protecting Human Rights Without a Bill of
Rights, Chief Justice French of the Australian High Court said
that “the [principle of legality] can be regarded as ‘constitutional’
in character, even if the rights and freedoms which it protects
are not.” To explain that “constitutional” character, he quoted an
arguably question-begging217 passage from Professor Trevor R.
S. Allan:
The traditional civil and political liberties, like liberty of the
person and freedom of speech, have independent and intrinsic
weight: their importance justifies an interpretation of both
common law and statute which serves to protect them from unwise and ill-considered interference or restriction. The common
207. Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Austl.).
208. Assistant Comm’r Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38
(Austl.); see J. Spigelman, The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective, 29 U. N.S.W. L.J., no. 2, 2006, at 147.
209. Krakouer v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 202 (Austl.).
210. Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 (Austl.).
211. Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399
(Austl.); Clunies-Ross v Commonwealth (1984) 155 CLR 193 (Austl.).
212. Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576, 594–96 (Austl.); Canterbury Mun Council v Moslem Alawy Soc’y Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 525 (Austl.).
213. See Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 177–78 (Austl.); French,
supra note 139, at 3–4.
214. See M. H. McHugh, Judicial Method, 73 AUSTL. L.J. 37 (1999); Lord Robert Walker, Developing the Common Law: How Far is Too Far?, 37 MELB. U. L.
REV. 232 (2013).
215. See French, supra note 162; Meagher, supra note 170, at 430–31.
216. See Dyzenhaus, Hunt, & Taggart, supra note 104.
217. The passage is “question-begging” because it does not explain how (and
why) common law rights may be considered “constitutional,” even though they
are “not formally entrenched against legislative repeal.” See infra Part V., for
an account and possible explanation for what this now entails in contemporary
(Australian) common law.
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law, then, has its own set of constitutional rights, even if these
are not formally entrenched against legislative repeal.218

This passage suggests, arguably, that whilst Parliament can
always statutorily modify or abrogate rights recognized as fundamental at common law, the language used must be clear and
unequivocal, which gives these fundamental human rights an
enhanced durability and strength against legislative encroachment. In any event, a new wave of legislation that is openly hostile to fundamental human rights, which began in 1980s and
continues to this day,219 provoked and inspired the rights consciousness of Australian judges. In the absence of a constitutional bill of rights and a deeply entrenched political reluctance
toward acknowledging formal rights, the Australian High Court
sought to fill this void to temper, if not resist (what they consider
to be), these deleterious legislative developments. To do so, the
Australian High Court turned to alternative legal sources—international law, common law, and indigenous constitutional
law—to develop a set of rules and principles to provide more ro-

218. T. R. S. Allan, The Common Law as Constitution: Fundamental Rights
and First Principles, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION: THE MASON COURT IN
AUSTRALIA 146, 148 (Cheryl Saunders ed., 1996); French, supra note 162, at
32.
219. A recent, egregious example is the Law Enforcement Legislation
Amendment (Powers) Act 2015 (Austl.). It authorizes that a person accused of
a criminal offence may be examined compulsorily by the Australian Crime
Commission on subject matter relating to the criminal charge and removes the
(previous) obligation of the Commissioner to ensure the transcripts of the examination are suppressed. Id. s 14. On the contrary, it outlines circumstances
where the disclosure of information to prosecuting authorities, which was obtained directly or indirectly from those examinations, is permitted. Id. s 16.
Another is Section 35P, which recently was inserted into the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Austl.) and gives power to the Australian domestic spy agency to detain citizens who are not suspected of any
crime for a week, and whilst detained, they must answer any question or face
the possibility of a five year maximum jail term. In the event that a journalist
reports on these matters, they too can be jailed for the same maximum period.
National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Austl.) (inserting s
35P into the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Austl.));
see also George Williams, An Australian Perspective on the UK Human Rights
Act Debate, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2015), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/10/27/george-williams-an-australian-perspective-on-the-uk-human-rights-act-debate/; Kieran Hardy, National Security Reforms and Freedom of the Press, 3 GRIFFITH J. L. & HUMAN DIGNITY 1 (2015).
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bust protection of fundamental human rights. Central to this judicial rights enterprise is the development of a strong Australian
species of clear statement rule for fundamental human rights
that erects a quasiconstitutional common law bill of rights that
is strongly resistant to legislative encroachment.
V. CONTROVERSIES AND QUESTIONS
The contemporary rights developments in Australia detailed
in Part IV are remarkable but controversial and problematic as
well. This Part will outline some of the normative—indeed constitutional—concerns with this jurisprudence of the Australian
High Court. As it turns out, old U.S. Supreme Court cases and
more recent public law scholarship is, once again, central to
these issues and analyses.
A. The Method and Justification for the Principle of Legality
The interpretive canon that was revived in contemporary Australian law as the principle of legality had its roots in old U.S.
law. The Australian High Court stated in 1908:
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would
overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart
from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to
general words, simply because they have that meaning in their
widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a
meaning in which they were not really used.220

This passage was in fact a direct quotation from the 1905 edition of the U.K. treatise, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes.221 As the Australian High Court recently noted, however,
the origins of that quotation can be traced to a statement made
by Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1805: “Where
rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from,
the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible
clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect

220. Potter v Minihan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (Austl.) (citations omitted).
221. PETER BENSON MAXWELL, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
122 (4th ed. 1905).
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such objects.”222 Clearly enough, the canon’s original justification—as with interpretive canons more generally223—was to determine authentic notions of legislative intention. This was so,
despite the fact that the judicial attitude toward statutes at that
time—in both Australia and the United States—was to view

222. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 390 (1805).
223. Professor Eskridge notes:
Anglo-American treatises on statutory interpretation from
the nineteenth century to the present have relied heavily on
the “canons of statutory construction,” a homely collection of
rules, principles, and presumptions. The canons have served
as a collective security blanket for lawyers and judges because they combine predictability and legitimacy in statutory
interpretation: by applying the relevant canon(s), the lawyer
can figure out what the legislature intended a statute to
mean, which in turn is a sure prediction of how a judge will
interpret it.
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 160, at 275; see also CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 82 (2011). Professor Nelson articulates the following:
Most of the canons that state policy-neutral rules about vocabulary and syntax can be thought of as helping interpreters
grasp the intended meaning of the statutory language, and
at least some of the canons that put thumbs on the scale in
favor of certain substantive policies can be thought of as telling courts how to proceed when their information about the
enacting legislature’s likely intent has run out. But these correlations are not perfect. A few canons that are entirely policy-neutral . . . are designed less to capture the likely intent
behind particular formulations than to regularize the courts’
approach to some recurring sources of ambiguity in English
syntax. If these canons help courts ascertain the intended
meaning of statutory language, it is only because legislators
have come to know about the canons and to read bills against
the backdrop that they provide. Conversely, many of the canons that favor particular substantive policies can be seen at
least in part as tools for helping interpreters discern likely
legislative intent, because the policies that they favor reflect
norms that American legislatures have long tended to follow.
NELSON, supra note 223, at 82.
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them as barely tolerable intrusions into the accumulated wisdom224 and perfected reason225 of the common law.226
In any event, the manner in which clear statement rules in the
United States were developed and applied is not without serious
constitutional and normative controversy.227 In terms of their
development, Professors Alexander and Prakash consider these
interpretive rules to be “constitutionally problematic,” as they
“doubt that the judicial power—the power to decide cases—gives
the federal judiciary the power to dictate interpretive rules to
Congress. The courts cannot dictate (or constrain) how Congress
must express itself.”228
As noted earlier, the judicial provisions of the Australian Constitution largely mirror those of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This makes the principle of legality—and the erection of
the common law bill of rights that it facilitated—open to the
same important constitutional objection.229 Notwithstanding the
“weighty precedential pedigrees”230 of most clear statement
rules, they are controversial because they “reflect judicially articulated policies that are sometimes enforced very vigorously . . .
224. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383
(1908); R v Janceski (2005) 64 NSWLR 10, 23 (Austl.) (articulating that, with
respect to the presumption that Parliament did not intend to change the common law, it was now of minimal weight, as it reflected an era where judges
treated legislation with hostility and resisted where possible its impact upon
the common law). But see Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357 (2015) (stating that judicial antipathy toward legislation was by no means universal amongst classical common
lawyers).
225. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND sec. 138 [97.b.] (1985); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE
COMMON LAW (1912).
226. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in
CARDOZO ON THE LAW 4–180 (1982); Dixon, supra note 1, at 152–65.
227. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005); Eskridge, Jr.
& Frickey, supra note 158, at 629–44; Abbe Gluck & Lisa Shultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 940–48,
956–64 (2013); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010).
228. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97,
102 (2003).
229. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 118, at 304–12.
230. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 158, at 598.
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and thus do affect the allocation of power, rights, and property
in [U.S.] society.”231 To this end, Alexander and Prakash persuasively argue that they “should be recognized for what they are:
attempts to drag statutes away from their actual meaning and
towards the substantive preferences of those who create the
rules of interpretation,”232 which, in the case of clear statement
rules, are the senior members of the judiciary.233
This constitutional objection unearths a serious normative issue with clear statement rules and, in particular, the manner in
which its strong Australian manifestation has been applied. The
judicial application of normative canons of statutory construction is not undertaken in faithful service of congressional intent.234 In their seminal article, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, Professors
Eskridge and Frickey note that “the substantive canons are not
policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.”235 In
Australia, Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy rightly argues that
“the presumptions are not really motivated by genuine uncertainty about Parliament’s intentions; instead, they amount to
quasi-constitutional ‘manner and form’ requirements, imposed
by the judiciary, to enhance Parliament’s accountability to the
electorate.”236 Arguably, that proposition is supported by Chief
Justice Gleeson’s observation that a
statement concerning the improbability that Parliament would
abrogate fundamental rights by the use of general or ambiguous words is not a factual prediction, capable of being verified
or falsified by a survey of public opinion. In a free society, under
the rule of law, it is an expression of a legal value, respected by
the courts, and acknowledged by the courts to be respected by
Parliament.237

231. ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 356.
232. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 228, at 109.
233. See Richard Pildes, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 907–10
(1982).
234. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: The New Textualism and
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 537 (2013); ESKRIDGE, JR.,
FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 9, at 341–42; Young, supra note 161, at 1380.
235. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 158, at 595–96.
236. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 118, at 308–09.
237. Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 577 (Austl.).
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But the principle of legality is not only “an expression of a legal
value, respected by the courts,” it is an expression of a legal
value that is made and enforced by the courts. That is why Professors Dyzenhaus, Hunt, and Taggart have said that the principle “is controversial, at least in so far as it requires judges to
construct common law values, and in respect of the material they
can legitimately use in this building exercise.”238 Those choices
are especially controversial, as the judicial assumption—that
certain fundamental human rights are so deep lying in the legal
order that “[i]t is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow [them] . . . without expressing its intention
with irresistible clearness”239—is so interpretively significant.
This is so because the application of the principle to protect the
common law bill of rights would limit the otherwise clear meaning of legislation.240 The potential for strained (rights-compatible) interpretations is increased further as the principle of legality can be applied in Australia without the existence of statutory
ambiguity beforehand.241
If the principle of legality is applied to protect fundamental
human rights in the teeth of legislation that aims to curtail or
abrogate them, it is difficult to square this concept with its original normative justification—the discovery of authentic legislative intention.242 The principle is still one of interpretation. When
appropriate, its role is to assist in working out the meaning of a
statute. That is indeed mandated if federal judicial power is to
be exercised in conformance with Chapter III of the Australian
Constitution.243 What then becomes decisive is the constitutional

238. Dyzenhaus, Hunt, & Taggart, supra note 104, at 6.
239. Potter v Minihan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (Austl.).
240. Sir Philip Sales (justice of the U.K. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division) argues that the principle of legality ought to be narrowly applied for
powerful constitutional reasons, as it operates to modify what is otherwise the
natural and ordinary meaning of legislation. See Sales, supra note 141, at 605.
241. This is a significant doctrinal aspect of the principle of legality. Arguably, it confirms that the true normative justification for the application of the
principle to the construction of statutes is not to honor authentic or likely legislative intention. See Daniels Corp Int’l Pty Ltd v Austl Competition & Consumer Comm’n (2002) 213 CLR 543, 552–53 (Austl.); Dennis Rose, The High
Court Decisions in Al-Kateb and Al Khafji—A Different Perspective, 8 CONST.
L. & POL’Y REV. 58, 59–60 (2005).
242. See Lim, supra note 116, at 378–94.
243. Relevantly, Chief Justice French states that
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role or interpretive duty of the courts in the construction of statutes more generally. Once that fundamental rule is determined,
the principle of legality must be applied necessarily in a manner
that is compatible with the interpretive duty of the courts. In
this regard, Professors Ekins and Goldsworthy recently noted
the following:
For at least six centuries, common law courts have maintained
that the primary object of statutory interpretation “is to determine what intention is conveyed either expressly or by implication by the language used”, or in other words, “to give effect
to the intention of the [lawmaker] as that intention is to be
gathered from the language employed having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed.”244

They did so to compare (and condemn) recent pronouncements
of the Australian High Court with respect to how judges should
interpret statutes that are at odds with this orthodox approach.
In the past, the Australian High Court has stated that “legislative intention . . . is a fiction which serves no useful purpose.”245

[t]he common law in its application to the interpretation of
statutes helps to define the boundaries between the judicial
and legislative functions. That is a reflection of its character
as “the ultimate constitutional foundation in Australia”. It
also underpins the attribution of legislative intention on the
basis that legislative power in Australia . . . is exercised in
the setting of a “liberal democracy founded on the principles
and traditions of the common law”. It is in that context that
this court recognizes the application to statutory interpretation of the common law principle of legality.
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46 (Austl.); see also Mark Aronson,
Statutory Interpretation or Judicial Disobedience?, U.K. CONST. L. BLOG (June
1, 2013), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/06/03/mark-aronson-statutoryinterpretation-or-judicial-disobedience/; Basten, supra note 11, at 3–8.
244. Richard Ekins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability
of Legislative Intentions, 36 SYD. L. REV. 39 (2014).
245. Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 592 (Austl.); see Robert French,
The Courts and Parliament, 87 AUSTL. L.J. 820, 824–25 (2013); Kenneth
Hayne, Statutes, Intentions and the Courts: What Place Does the Notion of Intention (Legislative or Parliamentary) Have in Statutory Construction?, 13
OXFORD U. COMMW. L.J. 271 (2013). But see Stephen Gageler, Lucinda Lecture
at Monash University: Legislative Intention (Sept. 18, 2014),
https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/141496/legislative-inten-
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Controversially, the Australian High Court then described the
nature of its interpretive function in the following terms:
[J]udicial findings as to legislative intention are an expression
of the constitutional relationship between the arms of government with respect to the making, interpretation and applications of laws. . . . [T]he preferred construction by the Court of
the statute in question is reached by the application of rules of
interpretation accepted by all arms of government in the system of representative democracy.246

As Ekins and Goldsworthy rightly observe, “[t]his suggests that
legislative intention is not something that exists before judicial
interpretation, but instead, is a product or construct of interpretation.”247 They argue that to untether statutory interpretation
from legislative intention in this way is contrary to constitutional principles and has the capacity to render “unintelligible”248 the settled interpretive practices of common law courts.
The problem identified here is that, “[i]f legislative intention is
a product of applying the principles of statutory interpretation,
but those principles direct the courts to infer the legislature’s
intention, then the dog is chasing its own tail.”249 In this approach to statutory construction, there are distinct echoes of
Bishop Hoadly’s famous statement made in a sermon to King
George I in 1717: “Whoever hath an ultimate authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Lawgiver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first
wrote or spoke them.”250
Again, Ekins and Goldsworthy rightly note that a possible example of this interpretive instability is “the way the so-called
tion-justice-gageler.pdf, for a recent defense of the relevance of legislative intention to statutory construction by a current justice of the Australian High
Court.
246. Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–56 (Austl.). While it is beyond the
scope of this article, the case raises the fascinating issue as to whether it is the
general common law powers that justify, or at least partly explain, the foundational shift undertaken by the Australian High Court, which the interpretive
proposition outlined in Zheng represents. It is this kind of (potential) impact
on the interpretive method of U.S. state courts that might be sourced to their
general common law powers, which Professor Pojanowski fruitfully explored.
See Pojanowski, supra note 42.
247. Ekins & Goldsworthy, supra note 244, at 41.
248. Id. at 42.
249. Id. at 44.
250. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 100 (1909).
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‘principle of legality’ seems to be evolving, from a genuine presumption of legislative intent, into a ‘constitutional principle’ operating like a manner and form requirement that express[es]
[that] words are needed to qualify ‘fundamental rights’, regardless of how obvious the legislature’s intention actually is.”251 The
Australian High Court’s reconceptualization of the interpretive
duty of judges as one where determining legislative intention is
the product—not the goal—of statutory construction is central
to that evolution. Of course, the use of the language of “legislative intention” here does not connote that the construction process is in fact being undertaken, and the principle of legality specifically is being applied to discover what the legislature actually
meant or likely intended.252 In this context, “legislative intention” is fiction that amounts to the meaning ascribed to the statute by the courts upon the principles of statutory interpretation
having been applied.253 Yet, the Australian High Court has
sought to underline the historical continuity of the principle of
legality in terms of its content and justification by endorsing the
centrality of “legislative intention” to its contemporary application. If this is to suggest that its application is to discover what
the legislature actually meant or likely intended, then, as Brendan Lim argues, this is to perpetuate a common law myth of continuity.254 As noted, however, the court has already dispensed
with its original normative justification of furthering authentic
legislative intention, both in terms of the principle of legality
and for the principles of statutory interpretation more generally.255
B. The Constitutionalizing of the Principle of Legality and Statutory Interpretation Principles
In the U.S. context, Professor Ernest Young observed that if
judges do not apply clear statement rules in order to discover
authentic notions of congressional intent, they must then offer
251. Ekins & Goldsworthy, supra note 244, at 44.
252. See Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378, 388–90
(Austl.); Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573, 591–92 (Austl.); Zheng v Cai
(2009) 239 CLR 446, 455–56 (Austl.).
253. See Hayne, supra note 245.
254. Lee v New South Wales Crime Comm’n (2013) 251 CLR 196, 397–10
(Austl.); see Lim, supra note 116, at 378–82.
255. Saeed v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252,
258–59, 271 (Austl.).
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an alternative normative justification for doing so. He suggests
that this justification is the U.S. Constitution itself.256 To recall,
in Australia, the contemporary justification for the principle of
legality offered by the Australian High Court is to promote democracy and rule-of-law values by improving the clarity and
rights sensitivity of legislation. This has led the Australian High
Court, necessarily and controversially, away from legislative intention and toward the Australian Constitution. In doing so, the
Australian High Court emphasized that the principle exists to
protect “rights, freedoms, immunities, principles, and values
that are important within our [constitutional] system of representative and responsible government under the rule of law.”257
This concept echoes Professors Hart and Sacks, who offer a distinct explanation of the account and role that policies of clear
statement rules may have on legislative power:
[T]hese policies of clear statement may on occasion operate to
defeat the actual, consciously held intention of particular legislators, or of the members of the legislature generally. . . . [I]n
other words, they constitute conditions on the effectual exercise of legislative power. But the requirement should be
thought of as constitutionally imposed. The policies have been
judicially developed to promote objectives of the legal system
256. Young, supra note 161, at 1380. But see Manning, supra note 227, at 404
(making the powerful argument that “if the legitimacy of constitutionally inspired clear statement rules depends on the plausibility of tracing them meaningfully to the Constitution, that burden cannot be met. Such rules seek to
enforce constitutional values in the abstract, standing apart from the constitutional provisions from which they are derived. . . . But constitutional values do
not . . . exist in the abstract. Values such as federalism, nonretroactivity, and
the rule of law, do not exist in freestanding form. Rather, like all constitutional
values, they find concrete expression in many discrete constitutional provisions, which prescribe the means of implementing the value in question.”).
257. Lee 251 CLR at 196, 310. In this passage, the Australian High Court
identifies key constitutional norms in Australia that are protected when the
principle of legality is applied to the construction of statutes. Moreover, there
are other constitutional norms (federalism, religious liberty, political communication, representative government, responsible government) that are presently either dormant or underenforced but have the capacity to expand the
content of the common law bill of rights and be vindicated through the principle’s application. Thus, the Australian High Court has the opportunity and
legal tools to deepen and systematize the (still nascent) interaction between
the Australian Constitution and its interpretive canons in a manner that is
comprehensively outlined by (for example) Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
468–502 (1989).
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which transcend the wishes of any particular session of the legislature.258

Arguably, this basal shift by the Australian High Court is one
important aspect of its wider project to provide a constitutional
foundation to Australian rules and principles of statutory interpretation. This lies at the heart of the proposition that “judicial
findings as to legislative intention are an expression of the constitutional relationship between the arms of government with
respect to the making, interpretation and application of laws.”259
With respect to these developments, Justice Basten of the Supreme Court of New South Wales observed that “[i]f statutory
interpretation is at the core of the judicial function, the Commonwealth Parliament must be constrained in its ability either
to expand or diminish that function.”260 That statement was
prefaced by Chief Justice Marshall’s famous passage from Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expand and interpret
that rule.”261 In Australian law, this judiciary rule is considered
“axiomatic.”262 Justice Basten’s passage serves to highlight the
centrality of the separation of powers to the interpretive role of
Australian courts and firmly locates that task within this constitutional framework. The proposition requires not only that
the content of all statutory rules and common law principles of
statutory interpretation—of which the principle of legality forms
an important part—conform to the constitutional separation of
powers but also that their application be central to the exercise
of federal judicial power established and conferred by Chapter
III of the Australian Constitution. Of course, these constitutional concepts that inform the content and limit the application

258. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1376 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
259. Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 455 (Austl.).
260. Basten, supra note 11, at 1.
261. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1834); see also Basten, supra note
11.
262. See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 263
(Austl.), where the High Court observed that, in Australia, the principle of
Marbury v Madison—that the courts not the legislature finally determine the
validity of legislation—was considered “axiomatic.”
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of the law of statutory interpretation cut both ways.263 It makes,
for example, the judicial rewriting of statutes constitutionally
impermissible.264 Moreover, the constitutional concepts are
stated at a level of abstraction that suggests rather than determines the sorts of rules and principles that might be properly
derived from them.265 It is important to remember that, in the
263. SPIGELMAN, supra note 10, at 110–111 (“[Roscoe Pound] characterised
spurious interpretation as an anachronism in an age of statutes and also as
inconsistent with the separation of powers.”). Famously, Pound stated:
The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the intention with which the lawmaker intended to establish; to discover the intention with which the lawmaker made the rule,
or the sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule
is expressed. . . . Employed for these purposes, interpretation
is purely judicial in character; and so long as the ordinary
means of interpretation, namely the literal meaning of the
language used in the context, are resorted to, there can be no
question. . . . [O]n the other hand, the object of spurious interpretation is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely
to discover. It puts a meaning into a text as a juggler puts
coins, or what not, into a dummy’s hair, to be pulled forth
presently with an air of discovery. It is essentially a legislative, not a judicial process.
Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381–82 (1907).
264. See Pidoto v Victoria (1943) 68 CLR 87, 110–11 (Austl.) (reasoning that
it was judicial legislation not interpretation—and so beyond the judicial function of the court—to rewrite a facially invalid law to bring it within constitutional limits).
265. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944–45 (2011) (“[T]he Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of powers. The idea of separated powers unmistakably lies behind the Constitution, but it was not adopted wholesale. The
Constitution contains no Separation of Powers Clause. . . . Rather, in the Constitution, the idea of separation of powers, properly understood, reflects many
particular decisions about how to allocate and condition the exercise of federal
power. . . . Viewed in isolation from the constitutionmakers’ many discrete
choices, the concept of separation of powers as such can tell us little, if anything, about where, how, or to what degree the various powers were, in fact,
separated (and blended) in the Philadelphia Convention’s countless compromises.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). In Australia, the largely abstract
(and maybe unthinking) conception of the separation of powers articulated by
the framers appears to be confirmed by Fiona Wheeler. See Fiona Wheeler,
Original Intent and the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Australia, 7
PUB. L. REV. 96, 99 (1996) (noting that the record of the convention debates
reveals that the framers gave little consideration to and were mostly unaware
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U.S. context, the same constitutional conception of federal judicial power—like the power to finally determine cases266—underpins the argument made by Alexander and Prakash: that clear
statement rules are “constitutionally problematic.”267 Alexander

of the significance of introducing the doctrine of separation of powers into the
Australian Constitution).
266. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 228, at 102. In Australia, the classic
definition of judicial power is:
[T]he power which every sovereign must of necessity have to
decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself
and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or
property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some
tribunal which has the power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called
upon to take action.
Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Austl.).
267. Professor Frickey raised this very point to an Australian audience at the
New South Wales Bar Association “Working With States” Conference in 2005,
which discussed Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. At the time,
this federal statutory provision in Australia stated: “In the interpretation of a
provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object
underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the
Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that
purpose or object.” Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s15AA (Austl.). Frickey wrote:
In the United States, there is no federal statute providing interpretive directions of this sort. Many States do have such
statutes. At the federal level, at least, there would be at least
some concern that legislative interpretive directives of this
sort intrude upon the constitutional separation of powers.
The venerable understanding in the United States is that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”: Marbury v. Madison, 5 US
137 at 177 (1803). This cliché could be understood as including within the judicial role not simply the attribution of
meaning to statutes, but the methodological questions concerning how that meaning is to be gleaned.
Frickey, supra note 2, at 856 n.31; see also Linda Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837 (2009) (making a detailed argument
concerning when statutory interpretive directives to judges violate constitutional separation of powers).
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and Prakash’s argument, however, conflicts with the recent jurisprudence of the Australian High Court with respect to the
common law principle of legality.
What is so extraordinary (as it is controversial) is that the Australian High Court’s untethering of legislative intention from
statutory interpretation (consciously or not) occasioned precisely
the kind of interpretive instability warned about by Ekins and
Goldsworthy: “To break the [vicious] cycle, something would
have to be changed. Thus, the new skeptical view [of legislative
intention] is inherently unstable.”268 In order to do so, the Australian High Court turned toward the inherently contested and
question-begging principles of the Australian Constitution to anchor the principle of legality and the interpretive process more
generally.269 Yet, in the future, such a foundational shift in judi-

268. Ekins & Goldsworthy, supra note 244, at 44.
269. Regarding the compatibility of the rules and principles of statutory interpretation with the Australian Constitution, Justice Basten rightly notes:
It is difficult to find any clear constitutional justification for
particular rules of statutory interpretation. It is not difficult
to accept that principles of statutory interpretation (not
rules) identify or reflect key aspects of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary. However, that is a
statement operating at a high level of generality and says little about the detail of that relationship, or about the respective functions of each arm of government. Indeed it begs an
important question as to whether principles of statutory interpretation perform the constitutional role of helping to define the functions of each arm, or whether they reflect functions defined elsewhere, or indeed play a dual role.
Basten, supra note 11, at 2. In the United States, Professor Manning makes
the point that “[t]he Constitution does not itself address interpretive norms.”
Specifically, Manning notes that
the Philadelphia Convention and the ratifying debates neither establish nor refute the idea that the Founders intended
“the judicial power of the United States” to assimilate the
practices known to the English common law tradition. Those
who framed and ratified the Constitution may have had an
array of views on equitable interpretation. Indeed, given the
paucity of discussion, many may have regarded the rules of
interpretation as a mere set of background norms, rather
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cial doctrine and practice will pose as many questions and problems as it will answer.270 One could argue that the principle of
legality points toward the fuller integration of statutes into the
Australian constitutional framework by requiring their interpretation and application to be compatible with constitutional
principles.271 To which a perfectly sound response might be that
it represents nothing more than a constitutionally dubious colonization of the legislative realm through an expanded conception
of federal judicial power and the concomitant expansion in the
discretionary power of judges which that entails.272 As Chief Jus-

than an inherent attribute of Article III power. The hard reality is that neither the framers nor the ratifiers systematically addressed, much less decisively resolved, the question
of appropriate interpretive norms.
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1670–71 (2001) (citations omitted).
270. Justice Basten says that
the clear statement rule [the principle of legality] might be
described as a principle of statutory interpretation: the proposition that it applies to statutory interpretation invites the
question as to whether it is self-referential. In other words, is
the clear statement rule not only a “quasi-constitutional
manner and form requirement” but an entrenched requirement? If so, how does it work? Can the Parliament override
the clear statement rule; or must it in effect comply with it in
order to overrule it? It is possible we will develop what, in the
USA, is called a “super-strong clear statement rule” effectively to entrench fundamental values. Such a course is facilitated by: (a) moving the language of statutory interpretation
from “intention” to objective meaning; (b) invoking what may
be a self-fulfilling reliance on principles “accepted by” legislators and the courts; and (c) identifying protected values in
a common law constitutional compact.
Basten, supra note 11, at 11; see also Ekins & Goldsworthy, supra note 244, at
42–46; Meagher, supra note 170, at 429–42.
271. See Young, supra note 161, at 1384.
272. See Ronald Sackville, Bills of Rights: Chapter III of the Constitution and
State Charters, 18 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 67, 79 (2011). The author (an acting
judge and Judge of Appeal on the Supreme Court of New South Wales) mentions that
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tice French recently observed, these ongoing developments further illustrate why and how “the [principle of legality] can be
regarded as ‘constitutional’ in character”273 and, furthermore,
what it means to say in doctrinal and normative terms that the
Australian High Court constructed a quasiconstitutional common law bill of rights.274
CONCLUSION
This article traced the evolution of fundamental human rights
protection provided by the courts in Australia. It is a fascinating
and controversial story that, at its most critical moments, was
and continues to be informed by U.S. constitutional law design
and statutory interpretation principles. On one hand, this is no
surprise when “roughly speaking, the Australian Constitution is
a redraft of the U.S. Constitution of 1787 with modifications

[m]uch of the debate in Australia about the virtues and drawbacks of a national statutory charter of rights has missed the
point. While the debate has raged, the High Court has carried
on uninterrupted and largely unnoticed by the general community the process of interpreting Ch[apter] III of the Constitution to entrench a constitutional bill of rights. It is true
that the Ch[apter] III bill of rights created by the High Court
is not and can never be comprehensive. But it is far less deferential to the will of elected Parliaments than a statutory
charter of rights.
Id. The author expanded on this theme in 2013, noting:
The three areas in which counter-majoritarian influence is
most evident – entrenched judicial review of administrative
decisions, the incompatibility doctrine (in its various forms)
and the implied freedom of political communication – share
common characteristics. They each rest, in whole or in part,
on contestable implications drawn from what is said to be the
text and structure of the Constitution. In each case, the application of the principal norm often involves the exercise of
contestable value judgments. The norms are framed in such
a way as to maximize the potential for further anti-majoritarian intrusions into areas hitherto the province and executive governments.
Ronald Sackville, An Age of Hegemony, 87 AUSTL. L.J. 105, 119 (2013).
273. French, supra note 245, at 827.
274. See Meagher, supra note 170, at 422–29.
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found suitable for the more characteristic British institutions
and for Australian conditions.”275 On the other hand, what is extraordinary is that the decision of the framers of the Australian
Constitution to consciously reject U.S. notions of formal rights
guarantees was not ultimately decisive in this regard. As Sir Anthony Mason276—one of the leading figures central to the new
judicial rights consciousness in Australia—portentously noted in
1995: “Just as the courts can protect common law rights by applying presumptive rules of construction, so they can protect
fundamental rights, even in the absence of constitutional entrenchment and statutory backing.”277 Australian jurisprudence
has proven this to be true.
The Australian High Court transformed an old interpretive
canon (with U.S. roots) into a strong Australian species of clear
statement rule for fundamental human rights called “the principle of legality.” It did so to fill the lacuna in formal rights protec-

275. Dixon, supra note 1, at 102.
276. Sir Anthony Mason was a justice of the Australian High Court from
1972–1987 and the chief justice from 1987–1995. Sir Anthony led a court that
was considered progressive and groundbreaking (by its supporters) but activist
and politically controversial (by its critics). See JASON L. PIERCE, INSIDE THE
MASON COURT REVOLUTION: THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA TRANSFORMED
(2006).
277. Mason, supra note 123, at 286. As detailed above, in 1939, Professor
Willis described strikingly similar developments that occurred in (pre-Charter)
Canada, where the courts used their interpretive powers to establish a common
law bill of rights. Willis, supra note 140, at 274. Professor Willis further noted:
“The main device employed to side-step a provision which purports to render
unreviewable the acts of an administrative body, is to apply to that provision
the well-known presumption that the legislature does not intend to deprive the
subject of his access to the courts.” Id. at 275. But, when the Canadian courts
encountered legislation with precisely that aim, they (like their contemporary
Australian counterparts) refashioned the interpretive presumption as Willis
observed:
To set up the presumption in the teeth of that course of legislative history is to fly in the face of the legislature. That is
exactly what the courts have done. They now use it, not as a
means of discovering an unexpressed intent but as a means
of controlling an expressed intent of which they happen to
disapprove. The presumption is now, in substance, a rule of
constitutional law masquerading as a rule of construction.
Id. at 276 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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tion in Australia and to temper—if not outright resist—increasingly common legislative attempts to eradicate fundamental human rights. The court’s application of the principle of legality
constructed a quasiconstitutional common law bill of rights,
which is protected robustly from legislative encroachment. In order to justify these normative developments, the Australian
High Court has now turned toward the inherently contested
principles of the Australian Constitution to anchor the principle
of legality and the interpretive process more generally. Controversially, this occurred as part of a foundational shift in judicial
doctrine and practice that considered legislative intention to be
the product—not the lodestar—of statutory interpretation.
Shortly upon his retirement from the Australian High Court,
Justice Dyson Heydon—the antipodean Justice Scalia278—made
278. During his tenure on the Australian High Court, Justice Heydon was
the sole proponent of originalism as the method by which the Australian Constitution must be interpreted and said that statutes must be given their original or historical (not dynamic) meaning. Just prior to his judicial appointment,
Justice Heydon railed against, what he considered to be, the illegitimate and
undemocratic activist tendencies of the Australian High Court when Sir Anthony Mason was its chief justice. See John Dyson Heydon, Judicial Activism
and the Death of the Rule of Law, 47 QUADRANT 9 (2003). His judgments on the
Australian High Court were often brilliantly written and mostly in dissent,
genuinely funny, and usually alone. See Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245
CLR 1 (Austl.). In a dissenting opinion to a judgment that invalidated a statutory bill of rights operating in the State of Victoria, he observed that
[t]he odour of human rights sanctity is sweet and addictive.
It is a comforting drug stronger than poppy or mandragora or
all the drowsy syrups of the world. But the effect can only be
maintained over time by increasing the strength of the dose.
In human rights circles there are no enemies on the left, so
to speak. . . . The judges of this country assert and apply the
doctrine of precedent with a stern and unbending rigidity—
except so far as it may affect their own conduct. The function
of ordinary judicial work is to protect the rule of law. But,
though vital, the task can be dreary and mundane. Often interest can only be found in rearranging the conventional order of legal clichés, or tinkering with the tired language of
legal tests, or trying to avoid the sterile conflict of stale metaphors. Judicial fires which have sunk low may burn more
brightly in response to a call to adventure. Where judicial appetites have been jaded or lost, the call may stimulate and
freshen them to grow with what they feed on.
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the following observations on these developments in contemporary Australian law:
There are other even more mysterious utterance[s] about the
principle of legality. As justified by Gleeson CJ, the principle
appears to be connected with a form of legislative intention. In
Zheng v. Cai five justices of the High Court said ‘judicial findings as to legislative intention are an expression of the constitutional relationship between the arms of government with respect to the making, interpretation and application of laws.’ . .
. Is this portentous pronouncement banal or profound? To start
with, whenever the High Court starts talking about its constitutional position, or that of the courts generally, it is time to
reach for one’s gun. . . . The difficulty with the principle of legality is that it is not hard for the courts, on experiencing distaste for a particular statute in its ordinary meaning, to identify a collision between it and some supposedly fundamental
right, but to hold that the ordinary meaning is not clear enough
to satisfy the principle of legality. The cry goes up: ‘Yes, of
course it’s fairly clear, but not quite clear enough.’ . . . The requirement that certainty of language exist before fundamental
rights can be overthrown can be treated so intensely as to go
close to constitutionalizing those rights as entrenched – virtually rendering them immune from legislative change. That,
perhaps, is why some people call the principle of legality “a
common law Bill of Rights.’’ When abused, the principle of legality thwarts the legislature and fails to give effect to the true
meaning of its legislation. Yet that is the task of legislative construction.279

The quasiconstitutional strength of fundamental human rights
protection in Australia that judges now provide—without a constitutional bill of rights—is an achievement as striking as it is
problematic from a normative, doctrinal, and constitutional perspective. Ultimately, it has shaken the very foundations of—and
the principles that attend to—the proper judicial role in the construction and application of statutes in a constitutional system
of separated powers.

Id. at 356–57.
279. John Deyson Heydon, The ‘Objective’ Approach to Statutory Construction, in QUEENSLAND LEGAL YEARBOOK 164–65 (2015) (citations omitted),
http://media.sclqld.org.au/documents/publications/queensland-legal-yearbook/2014/queensland-legal-yearbook.pdf.

